An analysis of the global financial crisis 2007 - 2008 by Kolobratnik, Kathrin
  
DIPLOMARBEIT 
 
Titel der Diplomarbeit 
“An Analysis of the Global Financial Crisis 2007-2008” 
 
 
Verfasserin 
Kathrin Kolobratnik 
 
angestrebter akademischer Grad 
Magistra der Sozial- und Wirtschaftswissenschaften 
(Mag. rer. soc. oec.) 
 
Wien, im November 2008 
 
Studienkennzahl lt. Studienblatt: A 157 
Studienrichtung lt. Studienblatt: Internationale Betriebswirtschaft 
Betreuer: em. Univ.-Prof. Dr. Erich Streißler 
ii 
 
 
Table of Contents 
LIST OF FIGURES……………………………………………………………………..…....ii 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS……………….……………..…………………………….......v 
INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................... 6 
I. RISK PERCEPTION ........................................................................................................... 3 
I.1) ASSUMPTIONS OF RISK TRADING MODELS ............................................................. 3 
I.1.1) Normal distribution ....................................................................................................... 3 
I.1.2) Independent variables and correlation .......................................................................... 4 
I.1.3) Measurement errors in the statistical model fitting ...................................................... 6 
I.2) MODERN PORTFOLIO THEORY AND FAT TAILS ..................................................... 6 
I.2.1) Market efficiency and Investor Rationality .................................................................. 8 
I.2.2) The Black Swan and Fat Tails ...................................................................................... 8 
I.2.3) Complex Adaptive Systems ........................................................................................ 11 
I.2.4) Wisdom of Crowds ..................................................................................................... 11 
I.3) RATING AGENCIES ....................................................................................................... 12 
II. TRANSMISSON MECHANISMS .................................................................................. 15 
II.1) INTEREST RATE CHANNEL ....................................................................................... 15 
II.1.1) Demand for money .................................................................................................... 16 
II.1.2) Counterarguments to the interest channel as a transmission mechanism .................. 17 
II.2) CREDIT CHANNEL ....................................................................................................... 22 
II.2.1) External finance premium and asymmetric information ........................................... 22 
II.2.2) Balance sheet channel ............................................................................................... 23 
II.2.3) Bank lending channel ................................................................................................ 25 
II.2.3.1) The cost channel ..................................................................................................... 26 
II.2.3.1.1) Bank based versus market based lending regimes .............................................. 26 
II.2.3.1.2.) Cross country differences and the cost channel ................................................. 28 
II.2.3.1.3) Cross country differences and the credit channel ................................................ 29 
II.2.3.1.4) Demand driven versus supply driven financial regimes ..................................... 31 
II.2.3.2) Criticism of the bank lending channel .................................................................... 36 
II.4) Interest rate smoothing ................................................................................................. 37 
II.5) Credit rationing ............................................................................................................ 38 
II.3) EXCHANGE RATE CHANNEL .................................................................................... 39 
II.3.1) The trade channel ...................................................................................................... 39 
II.3.2) The international financial channel ........................................................................... 40 
 
iii 
 
II.4) OTHER ASSET PRICE CHANNELS ............................................................................. 41 
II.4.1) Tobin´s q ................................................................................................................... 41 
II.4.2) Wealth channel .......................................................................................................... 41 
III. FINANCIAL INNOVATION ......................................................................................... 42 
III.1) FINANCIAL INSTABILITY HYPOTHESIS ................................................................ 42 
III.2) NEW CONFIGURATION OF PLAYERS ..................................................................... 43 
    III.2.1) Banks as providers of liquidity ................................................................................ 44 
III.3) SECURITIZATION ........................................................................................................ 45 
III.3.1) Collateralized Debt Obligations ............................................................................... 50 
III.4) FINANCIAL INNOVATION AND MONETARY POLICY ........................................ 50 
III.4.1) Marketisation of finance .......................................................................................... 50 
III.4.2) Procylicality ............................................................................................................. 51 
III.4.3) Financial Innovation and the Balance Sheet Channel .............................................. 51 
IV. GLOBAL IMBALANCES .............................................................................................. 53 
IV.1) LOW GLOBAL INTEREST RATES ............................................................................ 55 
IV.1.1) Investments .............................................................................................................. 56 
IV.1.2) Savings ..................................................................................................................... 58 
IV.2) THE GREENSPAN PUT ............................................................................................... 59 
IV.2.1) Falling Risk Premia ................................................................................................. 61 
IV.2.2) Implications of the “insurance policy” for the rest of the world ............................. 63 
IV.2.3) Flattening of the Philips Curve ................................................................................ 63 
IV.3) PORTFOLIO SHIFTS .................................................................................................... 65 
IV.3.1) “War chest of reserves” ........................................................................................... 65 
IV.3.2) Saving industrialised countries ................................................................................ 67 
IV.3.3) Oil exporters ............................................................................................................ 68 
IV.4) MONETARY- FISCAL POLICY MIX ......................................................................... 69 
IV.4.1) The optimal policy mix under Bretton Woods ........................................................ 70 
IV.4.2) Mundell revisited 2008 ............................................................................................ 71 
IV.4.c) The United States as external adjuster ..................................................................... 72 
VI.5) TWIN DEFICITS ........................................................................................................... 74 
IV.5.1) War finance and the budget deficit .......................................................................... 75 
IV.5.2) Debt finance and the current account ...................................................................... 75 
IV.5.3) The twins: Budget deficit and current account deficit ............................................. 77 
IV.5.4) The declining impact of fiscal policy on private saving .......................................... 79 
IV.5.5) The costs of government spending through fiscal and monetary policy ................. 80 
V. ECONOMIC OUTLOOK ................................................................................................ 82 
iv 
 
 
REFERENCES .................................................................................................................... - 1 - 
APPENDIX ........................................................................................................................ - 10 - 
ABSTRACT (ENGLISH): ................................................................................................ - 12 - 
ABSTRACT (GERMAN): ................................................................................................ - 13 - 
CURRICULUM VITAE ................................................................................................... - 14 - 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
v 
 
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
 
FIGURE 1:  Distribution of the S&P 500 stock market index ..................................................... 7 
FIGURE 2:  Ted spread: from October 2006 to October 2008 .................................................. 19 
FIGURE 3:  Spread of US Treasury bills over the middle rate .................................................. 19 
FIGURE 4:  European Money Market Spread ........................................................................... 20 
FIGURE 5:  US Mortgage ratio .................................................................................................. 24 
FIGURE 6:  Foreign holdings of US Treasury Securities .......................................................... 55 
FIGURE 7:  US Foreign Direct Investment ............................................................................... 57 
FIGURE 8:  Chinese holdings of US Treasury Securities from 2000 to 2008 ........................... 58 
FIGURE 9:  EWMA Volatility of S&P 500............................................................................... 62 
FIGURE 10:  Federal Funds Target Rate from 1999 to 2008 .................................................... 65 
FIGURE 11:  Case-Shiller House Price Index ........................................................................... 67 
FIGURE 12:  Interest rate differential US-Euro Area ................................................................ 73 
FIGURE 13:  US Current account balance ................................................................................. 74 
FIGURE 14:  US Personal Savings as percent of disposable income from 2003-2008 ............. 76 
FIGURE 15:  US Fiscal and Current Account Balance from 1973 to 2008 ............................... 78 
  
vi 
 
List of Abbreviations 
 
CAPM   Capital Asset Pricing Model 
CD   Certificate of Deposit 
CDO   Collaterized Debt Obligation 
CMO   Collaterized Mortgage Obligation 
CPI   Consumer Price Index 
E   Exchange rate 
ECB   European Central Bank 
EONIA  Euro OverNight Index Average, effective overnight rate in the 
interbank market 
EU   European Union 
Euribor Euro Interbank Offered Rate, daily reference rate in the euro wholesale 
money market 
EuroCOINTM leading coincident indicator for the euro area business cycle; indicator 
provides an estimate of the monthly growth of euro area GDP1 
FDI   Foreign Direct Investment 
Fed   Federal Reserve, Central Bank of the United States 
FIH   Financial Instability Hypothesis 
GDP   Gross Domestic Product 
G7 Group of Seven: France, Germany, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom, 
United States of America, Canada 
i   interest rate 
I   Investment 
IM   Imports  
IMF   International Monetary Fund 
LIBOR  London Interbank Offered Rate 
LTCM   Long Term Capital Management 
                                                 
1
 Definition from www.cepr.org (Center for Economic Policy Research) 
vii 
 
M   Monetary base 
Moody´s  Moody´s Investors Services 
NBER   National Bureau of Economic Research 
NX   Exports 
OECD   Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development  
ROA   Return On Assets 
SEC   United States Security Exchange Commission 
S&L crisis  Savings and Loan crisis 
S&P   Standard and Poor´s  
S&P 500 value weighted index of 500 large cap stocks actively traded in the 
United States; maintained by Standard and Poor´s 
T-bill   United States Treasury bill 
UK    United Kingdom 
US   United States 
USD   United States Dollar 
VaR   Value at Risk 
Y   Output 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The current financial crisis first appeared on the US housing market and quickly spread to 
other local and global market segments. 
Three broad factors, which I will discuss with respect to transmission mechanisms, have 
reinforced one another in a way that caused the financial market turmoil. Analyzing former 
crises, the reasons are not so unknown to market participants and policy makers. The 
abundance of liquidity in the financial system, the growth of the interwoven and complex 
financial system lead by financial innovation, the reduction in total reserve holdings of 
financial firms, and the actions taken by central banks resulted in an extensive build-up of 
leverage and global financial imbalances. The current crisis raises fundamental questions 
about the role of the banking industry, central banks and regulators, the US macroeconomic 
conditions, and the links between countries and global activity.  
Since journalists, politicians and other opinion leaders have given various interpretations of 
the causes leading to this complex and critical situation- often in search of a scapegoat- I want 
to point out the multiple dimensions of this crisis in order to create a basis for broader 
discussion on a possible remedy. 
In the first chapter I discuss risk and risk perception, which I perceive to be most fundamental 
in explaining the current crisis. Our environment is too complex to use linear models for any 
investment decision we take. Feedback mechanisms are partly responsible for why markets 
are prevented from becoming efficient as modern portfolio theory would require. Returns are 
not normally distributed, but show fat tails. I point out the measurement problems with 
mathematical models that are employed by financial market players on a wide-scale. The 
chapter also discusses the conflict of interest that rating agencies face. 
The second chapter analyses transmission mechanisms of monetary policy with respect to its 
validity in this crisis. In my structure I follow the classification by Mishkin (2007). The credit 
channel as a monetary transmission is discussed in detail, while also introducing the cost 
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channel. In order to point out the relative differences of bank- versus market- based financial 
systems I study a paper by Kaufmann and Valderrama (2007). 
The first two chapters provide the conceptual ideas of factors that have contributed to the 
immense debt creation and are further expounded upon in the remaining chapters. The section 
Financial Innovation describes how credit could have been made available easier before the 
crisis and how risk could be spread on a global scale. The chapter Global Imbalances further 
scrutinizes the “global savings glut” as stressed by Alan Greenspan (2005). 
Central banks around the world contributed to the developments that led to the crisis. The risk 
of deleveraging lies within the scope of global monetary policy risks. In my thesis I focus on 
Greenspan´s insurance policy, known as the Greenspan Put, and the role fiscal budgets play 
with regard to international capital flows. Emerging economies as well as OECD countries 
and their currency management heavily contributed to the developments on financial markets.  
As a conclusion, I comment on the repercussions I expect the crises to have on the US, 
Europe and Asia and try to give an economic outlook on a development, of which the severity 
still remains to be seen. Various reasons are put forward as to why the US has become the 
“world banker”. Deep mistrust on financial markets will pull money away from developing 
countries and investors will continue putting their money in the safe haven of US Treasury 
bills. Drawing from my analysis I do not see the US suffering as much as its lenders may. 
My analysis ends with November 1st 2008. 
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I. RISK PERCEPTION 
 
MISPRICING OF RISK 
In the run- up of the financial turmoil, one essential issue was the mispricing of risk. In an 
interwoven complex market environment, statistical assumptions underlying the mathematical 
models for predicting future returns and volatility failed to hold true in reality. 
Advances in financial know- how and technology permitted unbundling and re-bundling of 
risky payoffs of ordinary financial products. Illiquid assets such as loans were made liquid 
and parts of them could be sold off to the market. Not only hedge funds, but also those 
investors usually considered as risk averse, followed the market trend by investing in some of 
the numerous derivative products. Borio (2007) points out that financial innovation made it 
possible to separate various risk segments. Exchange rate risk or interest rate risk now can be 
separated from the traditional loan or security through derivative products. Swaps are used to 
hedge against these risk parameters. As the growth of credit default swaps and collateralised 
debt obligations shows, credit derivatives also gained in significance. 
The mathematics underlying the pricing of these products often follows an independent 
identical distribution (iid), which approaches a normal distribution. In reality, the random 
variables in derivative pricing do not follow a linear function.  
 
I.1. ASSUMPTIONS OF RISK TRADING MODELS 
I.1.1) Normal distribution 
Quantitative trading strategies work with mathematical models that have, as an underlying 
assumption, a normal probability distribution. For returns to follow a normal distribution, one 
must have a set of independently distributed returns with no extremes. In static systems this 
assumption is frequently valid, but not so in a dynamic system.  
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The assumption of a normal distribution results from the central limit theorem. The central 
limit theorem states that under certain conditions, such as being independent and identically 
distributed with finite variance, every variable that can be modelled as a sum of a large 
number of small random variables is approximately normally distributed. The assumption that 
many small, independent effects additively contribute to each observation, theoretically 
justifies the use of a model with normal distribution. 
In fact, random variables in finance are not additive, but rather multiplicative. Variables 
influence each other. Thus, the effect on the outcome is a combined contribution. The 
appropriate probabilistic model may then be a log-normal distribution, i.e. a normal 
distribution of the logarithms of the respective variables. In finance one uses the logarithm of 
the variable of interest to determine the return path of a security. Indirectly observed returns 
as opposed to values are thus observed to determine the distribution. 
If it seems implausible that a large number of small effects act additively and independently, 
the assumption of normality is not justified. If there is a single external influence (Fed policy) 
which has a large effect on the variable under consideration, the assumption of normality is 
not justified. The very crucial assumption to match a normal distribution is the required 
independence of the variables.  
 
I.1.2) Independent variables and correlation 
The observation that variables are neither correlated, nor normally distributed does not imply 
independence. Only if the random variables are jointly normally distributed would this feature 
be valid. Then the variables follow a multivariate normal distribution. If the random variables 
are uncorrelated, their covariance should be zero. They are independent variables.  
Variables can have a normal distribution and can be uncorrelated if one looks at them 
separately. But if their joint distribution is not normally distributed, they need not be 
independent. Independent statistics are always uncorrelated, but the inverse is not true. 
Quantitative trading strategies implicitly assumed probabilistic independence between events 
that turned out to be correlated. When modelling a social system that changes over time, the 
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assumption of independence might not hold true. Variables that were uncorrelated in the past 
need not be uncorrelated in the future. 
The inaccuracy of the mathematical models that banks and bank regulators had been using 
had also been an issue in 1998 during the crisis of Long Term Capital Management as a 
consequence of the Russian crisis and high risk aversion on capital markets. The measure 
employed to determine a bank’s capital need is VaR (Value at Risk). Edwards (1999) states 
that the applied mathematics leading to the crisis of LTCM was inadequate to fully capture 
the reserve requirement. He focuses on the implications for regulators and what can be 
learned from a crisis. He argues that relying on risk models to estimate exposures and capital 
requirements needs to be scrutinized.  
During periods of financial distress price volatilities explode which implies probability 
distributions with greater variances. Furthermore asset prices, previously thought to be 
uncorrelated, become highly correlated. This is because of the interdependence of variables 
contributing to the return of financial assets in certain periods of the business cycle.  When 
holding exotic instruments such as collateral debt obligations, the investor takes a position in 
a tranche. CDOs are split into tranches of notes to account for the different exposures to credit 
default. Following the priority rule of payments senior notes are paid before mezzanine notes, 
which are paid before equity notes. The pricing of CDO tranches reflect investors' expectation 
of the correlation of defaults in the underlying portfolio. According to Gibson (2004), the 
correlation risk of the various tranches can be characterised as business cycle risk. In 
recessions the correlation of the tranches increases. The tranches have defined risk and reward 
characteristics. The quality of the investment thus depends on the quality of the model 
assumptions that define the corresponding risk and return. The price of a tranche is sensitive 
to default correlation. If default is likely, losses are more likely to wipe out the equity and 
mezzanine tranche. The senior tranche thus gets more vulnerable too and its value decreases.  
Prices are hence extremely sensitive to estimation errors of the higher moments of the 
probability distribution. Derivative pricing is particularly sensitive to the distribution of pay-
off. 
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I.1.3) Measurement errors in the statistical model fitting 
In statistical model-fitting, an indicator of quality of fit is looking at the errors deviating from 
the model prediction, the residuals. If normality is assumed residuals should be independent 
and normally distributed. Any deviation from normality needs to be explained. Normality is 
the only observation that need not be explained. However, if the original data are not 
normally distributed, then the residuals will also not be normally distributed. This fact is 
usually ignored in practice, which means that looking at residuals is not an appropriate 
indicator for testing the model-fit. 
 
    I.2. MODERN PORTFOLIO THEORY AND FAT TAILS 
Modern portfolio theory in asset pricing builds on the efficient market hypothesis (EHM), put 
forward by Fama (1965). According to EHM investors´ reactions to information follows a 
random walk, i.e. today’s price it the best forecast for tomorrow’s price. The variation of 
prices is a random value following the Gaussian distribution. Price changes are independent 
of one another and occur as a result of unexpected information, which is by definition, 
random. Investors can act exuberant or fearful, but on average they are right and the average 
price is a function of the intrinsic value of an asset. 
But stock market returns do not follow a normal distribution as suggested by capital market 
theory. Return distributions show high kurtosis. The tails of the density function are fatter and 
the mean is higher than predicted by a normal distribution. Mandelbrot (1960) argued that 
stock price volatility is too great to justify a bell shaped curve. The hyperbolic decline in the 
tails of the empirical distribution appears to be one of the most elementary and pervasive 
stylized facts for financial markets. 
I tested the distribution of the S&P 500 to see whether the assumption of normal distributed 
returns holds. To test the null hypothesis that the return data from the American S&P 500 
stock index follows a normal distribution I used the Jarque Bera test. I worked with daily data 
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from January 1970 to September 23rd 20082. The statistic program R is the tool I employed to 
get my results. Based on the sample kurtosis and sample skew deviations from normality can 
be identified. A normal distribution has a skew of zero and kurtosis three. Excess kurtosis is 
zero. In the data sample of the S&P 500 the kurtosis takes on the value of 22.19, which is a 
positive number that describes a leptokurtic distribution of data. Characteristic for a 
leptokurtic distribution, sometimes also termed super Gaussian distribution, is the more acute 
peak around the mean and the fat tails.  
The statistic program calculates a p- value lower than the significance level of 0.99. Thus, the 
null hypothesis can be overthrown. The data is not normally distributed. Figure 1 depicts my 
findings graphically. 
 
Distribution S&P500
Returns
-0.08 -0.04 0 0.04 0.08
Figure 1:  Distribution of the S&P 500 stock market index 
 
                                                 
2
 Data from yahoo.finance, September 23rd, 2008. 
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I.2.1) Market efficiency and investor rationality 
Modern portfolio theory rests on the key assumptions of market efficiency and investor 
rationality. But it can be doubted that the assumptions of rational, well informed and 
homogenous investors would remain valid for various time windows. 
Rational investors can assess and optimize their risk- return outcome following the logic of 
the linear relationship of risk and return in the Capital Asset Pricing Model, CAPM.  
Behavioural finance and the current crisis show that the copy cat problem and herd behaviour 
are salient features of real markets and do not support a linear cause and effect logic. 
Not all investors are well informed about risk and return prospects. Behavioural assumptions 
on investor and managerial behaviour rather than rationality assumptions are more likely to 
explain decision making in finance. Decision rules are set in response to market conditions. 
Information is taken from the market environment and combined with personal views. This 
approach is also used in the asset allocation model of Black and Litterman (1992). Evidence 
from IPOs and mergers shows, that herd mentality and rules of thumb determine decisions 
which are similar among market participants (Loughran, Ritter and Rydqvist, 1994). 
 
I.2.2) The Black Swan and Fat Tails 
Taleb (2007) uses the black swan metaphor to help popularize the fat-tail idea. The Black 
Swan reference points to the scientific work of Karl Popper on induction. The black swan is 
an outlier event that has extreme impact and that humans seek to explain after the fact. 
Humans like to generalize about a system based on properties of a limited sample. The 
problem of induction should make us sensitive to which methodology serves us better, 
falsification or verification. Seeing lots of white swans doesn’t prove the theory that all swans 
are white (verification), but seeing one black swan does disprove it (falsification).  
On financial markets we observe inductive behaviour. When an asset price is goes up, the 
natural assumption is it will continue to do so. In this self- reinforcing process profitability 
and rising asset prices verify each other. The process feeds on risk appetite and market 
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liquidity. Higher prices reduce short- term volatility and improve liquidity. Within the 
financial system there are positive feedback mechanisms that generate pro-cyclicality. 
Indeed, prosperity can breed an unhealthy sense of security. And even if the financial players 
are aware of under pricing risk (Borio, 2007), competition forces them to “keep dancing as 
long as the music plays”3. For financial institutions leaving the market seems more costly than 
staying. Short horizons are crucial in assessing this problem. Mean- reversion, the tendency of 
a stochastic process to return to the average value, only holds true for longer horizons 
(Frankel and Froot, 1990). In the same token, the other self- reinforcing process is that the 
availability of external finance increases asset prices and output. This is known as the 
financial accelerator mechanism (Bernanke, Gertler, Gilchrist, 1996). This mechanism 
combines the importance of a borrower’s net worth for being able to receive funding and the 
fact that external finance is more expensive than internal funds due to the principal- agent 
problem. An upward trend on borrower’s balance sheet increases investments. 
Financial liberalisation facilitates access to markets and credit and increases external funding, 
which builds on perceptions of risk and wealth. Borio and Shim (2007) state, that we have 
shifted form a cash- flow constrained, to an asset backed global economy. An asset backed 
economy tends to be pro-cyclical, and even more so building up booms. 
Borio and Crockett (2000) observe that the financial markets behave differently from other 
markets. In other markets, price mechanisms will regulate supply and demand and equilibrate 
the market. This is not necessarily the case in financial markets as with feedback mechanisms 
in place “greater supply of funding liquidity generates additional demand for itself” (Borio, 
2007). Feedback mechanisms have already been discussed by Shleifer and Vishny (1997) in a 
model showing the limits of arbitrage. 
The authors state that most arbitrage trades intended to detect market inefficiencies are risky 
and require capital. Arbitrage trades in the real world are conducted by relatively few, but 
highly specified professional investors. Fundamental to such arbitrage trading is that in order 
                                                 
3
 Charles Prince, Citigroup´s CEO in an interview with the Financial Times on July 9th 2007. 
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to operate in the capital intensive arbitrage markets, fund managers step into an agency 
relationship with investors, such as banks, endowments and wealthy individuals. Arbitrageurs 
use their highly specified knowledge in order to achieve market efficiency. Since investors 
lack the profound understanding of the arbitrage market, they allocate money based on past 
returns of the arbitrageurs, i.e., they base their manager selection on past returns. 
So, if the mispricing that the arbitrageurs bet against worsens, investors usually withdraw 
their resources or the risk-averse arbitrageurs voluntarily abandon their original strategy and 
liquidate their positions in extreme circumstances. Shleifer and Vishny´s results of a 
performance based arbitrage model indicate that arbitrageurs have the weakest stabilizing 
effect when prices strongly diverge from fundamentals, since noise traders who push prices 
away from fundamentals provoke capital outflow of the funds under management. The 
current situation proves what the authors´ had already identified 1997. In both extreme cases, 
in an exuberant upwards trend and in a fearful downwards trend, the feedback mechanism 
constrains arbitrageurs in revealing the assets´ fair value. In “extreme circumstances” when 
funds are limited and external capital is not easily forthcoming the market is prevented from 
becoming efficient. 
As observed in the LTCM crisis in 1998 the copy cat problem reduces diversity of market 
participants and thus fuels pro-cyclicality. By copying LTCM´s trading strategy a vulnerable 
banking and financial system was created (Edwards, 1999). Risk management had not 
incorporated the herd behaviour. “Observational independence” underlying the risk 
management models is not given if the market follows the same strategies. 
The economic mechanism here is straightforward. Since everyone is applying very similar 
strategies, in a falling market traders have a hard time selling. LeBaron (2001) states that 
according to a Walrasian setup, prices drop by a large magnitude to clear the market. Hence, 
population homogeneity translates into a reduction in market liquidity (Keynes, 1936, p.173). 
 
 
 
11 
 
I.2.3) Complex adaptive systems 
Drawing on findings in the fields of biology and physics researchers at the Santa Fe Institute 
in New Mexico articulated a phenomenon called complex adaptive systems. Financial 
markets can be referred to as a complex system adapting to its environment. Complex means a 
large number of participants. Adaptive is the feature describing decision rules resulting from 
interaction among market participants. Paraphrasing Mauboussin (2007), in a competitive 
environment various decision rules compete with one another. The most effective one will 
survive and be adapted by others. In a system, the sum is greater than its parts, which is 
explained by the interaction and adaptation of rules within the system. In a complex system 
investors´ behaviour is not determined by rationality, but rather by social and psychological 
factors. 
 
I.2.4) Wisdom of crowds 
A colloquial way of describing the market as a complex system is introducing behavioural 
finance and the phrase "wisdom of crowds". In an interview 2004, William Sharpe declares 
himself as a fan of behavioural finance. Even though “these sort of almost silly models in 
which everyone knows everything and everybody is perfectly rationale”, traditional asset 
pricing models can be good in terms of prices, risk and return. “The basic argument [of the 
wisdom of crowds idea] is that if we have enough people even though they may be ill- 
informed and irrational coming to the market, it is entirely possible the prices of assets, 
thereby true risks and returns, are what you get if they were all rational and well informed” 
(Sharpe, 2004). 
Sharpe (2004) refers to the book by James Surowiecki, an American journalist who first 
published a book on the phenomenon of wisdom of crowds. Work dealing with this 
phenomenon shows that when certain conditions are met - diversity, aggregation, and 
incentives - markets tend to be efficient. Conversely, when one or more of these conditions 
are violated, markets become inefficient. Then the price is no longer an unbiased reflection of 
the value of an asset. 
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Statistical properties of price movements in financial modelling are not valid in reality. 
Mechanisms that make movements diverge from the “normal form” stem from the fact that 
efficient markets are constrained when these three necessary conditions are not fulfilled. 
Diversity is the condition most likely to be violated. Diversity means cognitive diversity, 
which summarizes diversity in how people make their decisions. Social diversity is the term 
used in organisational structuring to achieve this form of diversity. But to be precise, social 
diversity does not necessarily mean cognitive diversity. If investors apply the same strategy, 
this condition is not met. 
The condition of Aggregation demands that information is correctly aggregated, i.e., different 
viewpoints have to be aggregated to one shared opinion. Stock exchanges take the role of 
aggregating information. 
Incentives as a condition to make optimal decisions, to make the market efficient, refer to the 
rewards investors can expect when making the right decisions. Corporate finance has created 
vast literature on incentive based compensation and its implementation. The problem to be 
overcome is the problem of short term horizons for assessing risk (Borio, Shim; 2007). When 
the time horizon is short, it is easier to expect the current situation to continue. In a market 
that is confirming strategies, that generated profits, incentives appear to respond to short time 
horizons rather than aiming at long term performance. Relying on market prices and not being 
able to identify the deterioration of repayment prospects - if at some longer horizon adverse 
events occur - result in pro-cyclicality.  
 
    I.3. RATING AGENCIES 
Rating agencies have come under criticism for rating the complex products that are made -
among other factors- responsible for the widespread defaults on US subprime mortgages and 
the ensuing credit market crisis. The agencies had already been involved from 2001 to 2002 
for not having spotted signs of problems at Enron and WorldCom, the US utility and telecoms 
giants that went bankrupt after the publication of fraudulent accounts.  
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In July 2007, the US Security and Exchange Commission (SEC), reported its findings on the 
practices of the three rating agencies Fitch Ratings, Ltd. (“Fitch”), Moody’s Investor Services, 
Inc. (“Moody’s”) and Standard & Poor’s Ratings Services (“S&P”). The tenor of the report 
makes clear that the SEC thinks that the ratings shortcomings enabled the increase in 
mortgage securitizations that contributed to the subprime meltdown. The issuance of a credit 
rating for each tranche of the collaterised debt obligations and mortgage-backed securities is 
an essential component in the creation and sale of subprime instruments. The issuer of the 
product seeks to get a rating; he arranges the deal, which gives him the description of 
“arranger”.  
Tranching allows for creating an AAA (S&P) or AAA (Moody´s) -rated asset out of a 
subprime collateral because each tranche is assigned a particular risk profile. The first dollar 
of income goes to the securities in the tranche with the highest rating, while the first dollar of 
loss is assigned to those with the lowest rating. 
Working themselves through internal communication documents, exchanged within the rating 
agencies, the SEC staff identified some reasons for the inability of ratings to predict unsound 
developments. 
First, the substantial increase in the number and complexity of deals with collaterised debt 
obligations and mortgage backed securities proved not to be well understood by the agencies 
and suffered due to a lack of staff. Besides the difficulty of coping with the volume of the 
deals that needed rating, limitations on the availability of data increased the shortcomings of 
the ratings. Historic data, used in the quantitative models, were based on periods of rising 
house prices, thus not fully capturing an adequate distribution.  
Second, there is no legal requirement that information which agencies receive from the 
arrangers needs to be verified in the form of due diligence. Information about the quality of 
the assets underlying the structured products is second- hand and its quality is not guaranteed. 
Third, the documentation of the rating process was found to be incomplete. Agencies did not 
always follow their internal procedures. Moreover, the quality of surveillance after the 
issuance revealed some leakages. This leads to the fourth point, the conflict of interest.  
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“The issuer pays”- conflict exists in all asset classes that receive ratings. With structured 
products this conflict may be exacerbated for the following reasons: Since the “arranger” of 
the rating is often “the primary designer of the deal” (SEC Report, 2007), he also has the 
flexibility to adjust the deal structure to obtain the desired credit rating. The analyst conducts 
an analysis of the pool of assets underlying the product. In a further step he develops 
predictions about the future path of the security applying quantitative expected loss models as 
well as qualitative factors.  The outcome of stress tests, with different grades measuring the 
severity of defaults, determines the rating. Another key element in the rating is the test of 
capital structure against the requirement for a particular rating. The analysts reveal to the 
arranger whether the capital structure supports the desired rating. By doing so, the rating 
agency gives a recommendation on capital structure. 
The analysts were also allowed to engage in fee discussions, which may increase the conflict 
of interest. The concentration in the underwriting business is high. According to the SEC, 
80% of the deals in number and dollar volume are conducted by twelve underwriting firms. 
Agencies seek to keep the business relationship upright, since it is its vital source of income 
streams. 
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II. TRANSMISSON MECHANISMS 
 
The monetary transmission mechanisms describe the process through which monetary policy 
decisions affect the economy in general and the price level in particular (ECB). The 
transmission mechanism is characterised by long, variable and uncertain time lags. Thus it is 
difficult to predict the precise effect of monetary policy actions on the economy and price 
level. 
Since the 1980s, under the chairmanship of Paul Volcker and Alan Greenspan at the Federal 
Reserve, monetary policy was more and more thought to have the means to stabilise output 
and keep inflation low. Against the background of budget deficits in the era of John F. 
Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson and the difficulty to make tax and spending decisions in a 
timely fashion (Mishkin, 1995) fiscal policy has lost its lustre in the 60s. Monetary policy has 
become a recognized tool for macroeconomic policymaking. 
To successfully apply the tools of monetary policy it is required to understand the 
transmission mechanisms through which monetary policy affects the real economy. Standard 
literature discusses the mechanisms in the setting of interest rate, exchange rate and other 
asset price effects, as well as the credit channel. In my theoretical outline I will follow the 
transmission mechanism outlined by Mishkin (2001). 
 
    II.1. INTEREST RATE CHANNEL 
The interest rate channel is the key monetary transmission channel in Keynesian  economics. 
This mechanism can be shown in a schematic diagram: 
M↑  i nom ↓  I↑  Y ↑                
An increase in the money supply (M↑) translates to lower nominal interest rates (i nom ↓) and 
higher investment (I↑). An increase in aggregate demand increases output (Y↑). This 
mechanism applies equally to business and consumer spending. 
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Keynes argued that the solution to depression was to stimulate the economy ("inducement to 
invest") by reducing interest rates and increasing government spending in infrastructure. In 
his approach, monetary easing via the interest rate as a policy instrument should start a 
cascade of events that stimulate economic activity further and multiple the effect of the initial 
stimulus (Blinder, 2002). 
 
II.1.1) Demand for money 
Keynesian theory has as a starting point, the focus on the demand side for money. A change 
in supply can alter expectations and thus change demand.  
In Keynesian economics non- neutrality of money is assumed. That is, any change in money 
supply does have effects on consumption, employment and growth. The underlying argument 
is that prices and wages are sticky and do not adjust to an unexpected change in the money 
supply. In the short run the rigidity of consumption and wages thus changes the real money 
supply. In the long run the change in money supply should be offset by the adjustment 
process of prices. In periods of downturns in the economy the short run is extended. The 
reactions to the monetary stimuli are slower. Instead of investing, risk aversion forces market 
participants to holding cash. This behaviour prevents prices from rising. 
 
Quantity Theory of Money 
Keynes contributed to the theory of money demand and responded to Irving Fisher’s classical 
quantity theory of money. According to Fisher, velocity of money captures the link between 
total spending and total quantity of money. Velocity of money is a measure of how often per 
year an average unit of money is spent. Fisher states that velocity depends on institutions and 
technology and thus is fairly constant in the short run. A change in money supply changes 
prices, but leaves velocity stable. Money demand is proportional to nominal spending.  In 
Fisher’s identity interest rates have no influence on money demand. Empirical data shows that 
velocity cannot be treated as constant. In recessions, velocity decreases. Keynes (1936) 
abandoned the idea of constant velocity.  
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In the Liquidity Preference Theory he postulates three motives for holding money: 
- The transactions motive assumes that money is a medium of exchange to conduct every 
day’s transactions. Just as in the classical theory, transaction demand is proportional to 
income. 
- The precautionary motive says that money is a cushion against unexpected needs. 
Precautionary demand is also proportional to income and sensitive to interest rates. Agents 
face a trade off between the benefits of holding money (transactions, precaution) and the costs 
(interest rate) of doing so.Changes in interest rates alter the optimal level of transaction and p 
recautionary demand. 
- Money is a store of wealth. This speculative motive for holding money depends on income 
(or wealth), but also on actual and expected interest rates. 
 
For Keynes, interest rates determine the opportunity cost of holding money in a world with 
two assets, money and bonds.  As risk aversion increases, demand for money rises. People 
want to hold more money.  Lower interest rates should keep agents from behaving that way 
and increase velocity.  
 
II.1.2) Counterarguments to the interest channel as a transmission mechanism 
A key monetarist objection to the Keynesian paradigm is that its focus of monetary policy 
actions is only on one relative asset price, namely the interest rate. Instead, monetarists are of 
the opinion that it is vital to look at how monetary policy affects a wide universe of relative 
asset prices and real wealth, especially in markets for equities and real estate. The IS- LM 
model and later the Mundell- Flemming model, which relate money supply and the interest 
rate to aggregate income and output, is too narrow to capture monetary policy’s influence. 
Monetary stimuli change actual and anticipated prices of a variety of domestic and foreign 
assets (Meltzer, 1995).   
Both Keynesians and monetarists explain how monetary policy affects asset prices. In the 
Keynesian view, contractionary policy increases the incentive to hold more bonds than equity.  
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Consequently, the price of equity drops. Monetarists argue that a change in the money supply 
changes the marginal utility of holding money relative to other assets and consumption. 
Monetary contraction leaves the public with less money than it wants to hold. In order to 
compensate for that, money holders attempt to adjust prices to restore equilibrium. This is 
done by reducing spending and consumption. The stock market is one place, where spending 
is reduced. A decrease in demand lowers equity prices.  
Meltzer (1995) argues that the transmission mechanism of monetary policy begins on asset 
markets. Information and transaction costs are lower with asset prices than costs associated 
with the adjustment in production, change in consumption and investment in durables. The 
adjustment in asset prices is particularly strong when uncertainty about the persistence of the 
stimulus exists. Asset prices react both to permanent as well as to transitory effects. Lower 
interest rates in a recession might not translate into higher business spending.  
Currently, we experience extremely low interest rates in the US. As the figures show, it was 
the household sector that drew cheap credit due to this circumstance. Investment from the 
business sector in the US did not so much react to low interest rates. Low interest rates 
affected demand for global products. 
 
Would lower interest rates, to counteract the current turmoil, induce business spending and 
prevent the economy from cooling down? The answer is no. Firms will consider whether their 
investment can be employed in the future with a financially weak household sector, which is 
not able to borrow in the near future as it did in the recent past. Against the background of 
extremely low savings rates in the US, additional spending on durable goods and housing is 
not easily feasible. Most banks are unwilling to lend given the unsound development and 
economic prospects. The degree of prevailing risk aversion in the market can be captured by 
looking at the spread of the interbank rate to the policy rate and the long- term – short-term 
bond spread.  
Figure 2 shows the Ted spread, the difference between the three- month Libor and the three- 
month Treasury bill yield. The dramatic widening of the spread is due to the immense fall in 
the three- month Treasury bill rate, which yielded 0.022 percent on 15 October 2008. Since 
investors seek to flee to secure financial products, the yield of Treasury bills has been falling.  
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The return they generate is negative if inflation is considered. Figure 3 depicts the spread 
between the 30 year (the green line), the 10 year (the blue line) and the 2 year Treasury bill, 
which has widened more than 250 basis points after the bankruptcy filing of the investment 
bank Lehman Brothers in September 2008.  
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Figure 2: Ted spread: Spread between 3- month LIBOR and 3- month Treasury yield from October 2006 to 
October 2008; Source: Thomson Datastream 
Figure 3: Spread of US Treasury bills over the middle rate with distinct times to maturity; 
 Source: Thomson Datastream 
 
 
Wide spreads between the term funding rates (of which many bank loans are priced off of) 
and the policy rates, reduce the efficiency of policy rate adjustments when needed (Noyer, 
2008, Bank of France). The critical point is to examine how far the policy rate influences the 
market rate.  
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Taylor (1995) claims that during cyclical fluctuations the many short term interest rates in 
place are all highly correlated, and that research focuses on the Federal Funds rate, as a short- 
term private market rate (Brayton, Marquez; 1990). Currently, we do not observe a high 
correlation between the policy rate and other short term rates. The central bank can control the 
Federal Funds rate, but it cannot control the Fed Prime Rate or LIBOR rate. I calculated the 
correlation of the Libor rate with the federal funds target rate for the period from 2006 to 
2008 and got a negative correlation of 0.32 between the two rates, which underpins the 
criticism of explaining the interest rate channel of monetary policy, especially in a critical 
market environment. 
As the spreads of the central bank target rates and the interbank rate show, the central bank 
cannot control for the pass through of the interest rate to the real economy. The spreads are 
the result of high risk aversion on the markets. According to the European Central Bank 
(ECB) the sub-prime mortgage crisis spilled over to the euro area money market on the 9th of 
August 2007 as indicated by the spread between the three – month Euribor and the Eonia 
swap rate. Figure 4 shows the widening spread of the three- month Euribor and the Eurepo 
rate as money market tensions increased on European markets. Eurepo is the rate at which one 
prime bank offers funds in euro to another prime bank. The data plotted ranges from October 
2006 to October 2008.  
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Figure 4: European Money Market Spread between three- month Euribor and ranging from 2006 to 2008, 
Source: Thomson Datastream 
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Bernanke and Gertler (1995) argue that the interest rate channel is incomplete in its reasoning. 
The authors discuss some empirical responses to monetary policy shocks to explain their 
starting points. First, typically monetary policy only has transitory effects on the interest rate, 
but the decline in the price level and real GDP following monetary tightening is more 
sustained. Second, final demand falls relatively quickly after the monetary policy shock. 
Production is second to fall, with a lag in time. Business investment follows the downward 
path. 
The sharpest and earliest decline in spending is observed with housing. Next come consumer 
goods and spending in production. In the short run inventory stock piles rise before ultimately 
declining as a result of reduced production due to falling demand. Business investment is last 
to fall in demand. Inventory disinvestment accounts for the largest portion of a declining 
output. 
Bearing in mind the stylized facts, the authors identify three puzzles not explained by the 
interest channel.  
- One is in regards to the magnitude of the policy effect. Even though interest changes may be 
small, the real economy may be strongly affected. Empirical studies did not find reasonable 
effects of increased cost of capital on spending. “Accelerator” variables (Bernanke, Gertler, 
Gilchrist; 1996), such as lagged output, sales or cash flow do have an impact on spending. 
- The second puzzle relates to the issue of timing. Some components of spending, such as 
consumer durables and business investment, react relatively late. Bernanke and Gertler find 
that these sectors show reaction only after 3 to 4 months after the interest rate change. 
- The third puzzle is why an overnight rate, such as the federal fund rate, has so much impact 
on spending on long lived assets, such as housing and production expenditure. Investment in 
those assets should be primarily responsive to real long- term interest rates. 
Criticism of the interest rate channel goes beyond the failure to explain whether short term or 
long term interest rates determine investment and consumption. Neglecting the adjustment of 
asset stocks to new investment and capital accumulation, the role of intermediaries is a further 
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aspect critics point out as a shortcoming of the IS- LM model (Meltzer, 1995). Money supply 
is considered to be that of the monetary base or proportional to it.  
Not satisfied with the neoclassical cost of capital approach Bernanke and Gertler (1995) find 
explanations for the puzzles of magnitude, timing and composition by extending the 
discussion to the credit channel. Bernanke and Blinder (1993) show, that the federal funds 
rate affects bank activity in respect to the loan supply. In his studies on the Great Depression, 
Bernanke (1983) uses data on the supply of loans and finds that the credit situation is able to 
explain the persistence of low GDP growth as well as the severity of the financial crisis. 
 
    II.2. CREDIT CHANNEL 
Bernanke and Gertler emphasize that the term credit channel is not a free standing, distinct 
alternative to the traditional transmission channels, but rather captures “a set of factors that 
amplify and propagate conventional interest rate effects”. 
 
II.2.1) External finance premium and asymmetric information 
Basic to explaining the transmission process of the credit channel is the external finance 
premium. This premium constitutes the difference between an internal funding rate and an 
external one. It reflects the “deadweight cost” associated with asymmetric information.  
The difference between the opportunity cost of retained earnings and the cost of external 
finance is also referred to as the “lemons´ premium”. Akerlof (1970) explains the problem of 
adverse selection via a used car market, where the seller has better information than the buyer. 
The buyer of a car simply does not know which cars are the lemons and which ones are the 
peaches. Given that buyers cannot tell the quality of the car, all cars will sell at the same price. 
Since the buyer wants to get compensated for the risk of purchasing a lemon, the price of all 
cars is reduced. Non lemon car sellers will be inclined not to sell at the price under value and 
will leave the market. 
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To apply this information problem to credit markets, the bank can be referred to as the 
`buyer´, and the borrowers as the `sellers´. Whenever there are informational frictions a risk 
premium has to be paid to cover the expected costs of evaluating and monitoring the lender, 
as well as expected costs of collecting the interest payments. An increase in the interest rate 
also increases the external finance premium. This premium alters the borrower’s net worth 
and cash flow.  
Taking the agency problems in imperfect financial markets as a starting point, two basic 
channels of transmission arise in a credit market, the bank lending channel and the balance 
sheet channel. 
 
II.2.2) Balance sheet channel 
Studies in the field of corporate finance show that equity disciplines the management to act in 
the shareholders´ best interest. An optimal portion of equity ownership reduces the principal- 
agent problem (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
The same problem prevails in credit finance. The customer’s net worth plays a crucial role in 
assessing the creditworthiness of the lender. A greater share of self financing or being able to 
offer collateral to guarantee the liabilities reduces the agency problem. The greater the 
borrower’s net worth, the lower the external finance premium and the easier to access credit. 
In the real world the requirement of financial ratios, such as the equity ratio and down 
payments or collateral provisions should help reduce the problem. There are direct and 
indirect effects that can weaken a borrower’s balance sheet: 
Outstanding short-term- or floating- debt directly weakens the borrower’s financial position. 
Reliance on short term debt and working capital deteriorates cash flows in a situation of 
tighter credit conditions. Consequently, asset prices drop. The classical Discounted Cash Flow 
method shows that the equity position is overvalued and that it will drop to its fair value. 
Monetary tightening also has indirect effects on cash flow. It reduces spending by customers 
due to the restricted access to credit and/or increased cost of borrowing. Firms as well as 
households tend to smooth “cyclical variations” by borrowing to overcome financing gaps 
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(Bernanke, Gertler; 1995). The gaps arise from a discrepancy of fixed costs versus revenues 
or income, respectively. 
If income decreases because of decreasing demand by customers the financing gap widens, 
since fixed costs still need to be paid. This development increases debt and reduces 
creditworthiness. The external financing premium, and with it, interest expenses for its 
floating debt rate rises. Bernanke and Gertler find evidence for the link of monetary policy to 
the financial position of borrowers. They plot the coverage ratio and the mortgage burden 
along with the Federal Funds rate and find an obvious co-movement of the ratio with the 
interest rate. The coverage ratio is a measure for a firm’s financial health and 
creditworthiness. The “mortgage burden” (Boldin, 1994), the ratio of mortgage payments to 
income is the respective measure for households.  
I want to show the relation found by Bernanke and Gertler for the more recent period of 2000 
to 2008. However, the analysis I conducted with data from the data download program of the 
Federal Reserve does not show such an obvious co-movement of the funds rate and the 
mortgage ratio. (See figure 5.)  
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Figure 5: “Mortgage ratio”, data source: Federal Reserve 
As can be seen from the spread of the interbank market rate against the policy rate, banks´ 
willingness to lend to the financial sector is extremely low. Banks´ balance sheets deteriorated  
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at the same time as household balance sheets did. The subprime mortgage crisis is a banking 
crisis. From the perspective of monetary transmission mechanisms, a banking crisis makes 
supporting an economic upturn through monetary actions extremely difficult.  
 
II.2.3) Bank lending channel 
Schematically, the monetary effect of the bank lending channel is as follows: 
M ↓  bank deposits ↓  bank loans ↓  I↓  Y↓ 
The bank lending channel analyses the effect of monetary policy on the supply of loans by 
depository institutions. Banks play an important role in monitoring and evaluating borrowers. 
They are the best informed creditors thanks to their screening tools. The model of the bank 
lending channel by Bernanke and Blinder (1988) argues that central bank open market sales 
drain reserves and hence bank deposits. Lower deposits reduce banks´ possibility to fund 
loans. Similarly, higher reserve requirements also reduce loan supply. So, if money supply is 
expanded, bank deposits take the same direction. This process results in more bank loans, 
which boosts investment. The opposite is true as well. 
Bank credit is especially important for small firms. Due to asymmetric information, small 
firms rely heavily on banks for funding, whereas large firm have access to credit through the 
stock and bond markets. This is, however, not so clear in a serious financial market downturn 
with cash hoarding: Required stock and bond market returns might become prohibitive. Banks 
have specialized in reducing the informational problems in credit markets. Modern financial 
markets most likely have diminished the importance of the traditional bank lending channel, 
but still relationship banking is an important source for funding. The bank lending channel 
thus transmits monetary policy with respect to bank dependent types of borrowers.  
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II.2.3.1) The cost channel 
The cost channel is the transmission mechanism that works through the supply side or cost 
side effects of monetary policy. It completes the view of a market, where supply meets 
demand, by adding the supply side to the scope of the transmission mechanisms. The cost 
channel is part of the broad credit channel and focuses on the pass through of monetary policy 
through borrowing costs. The interest rate channel and the exchange rate channel represent 
the aggregate demand channel. The cost channel focuses on the supply side of products and 
services. Central banks can directly influence marginal costs of firms by setting a policy rate. 
Borrowers´ balance sheets and the economic environment determine the supply of funds. 
These two factors do matter, not only for the intermediation decisions of banks, but also for 
those of markets. Chowdhury et al. (2005) show empirically that there are cross- country 
differences in the strength of the cost channel to the pass- through of monetary policy. 
Kaufmann and Scharler (2006) analyse whether the differences in financial systems across 
countries impact the effectiveness of the cost and credit channel, respectively.   
 
II.2.3.1.1) Bank based versus market based lending regimes 
Allen and Gale (2000) analyse financial systems. They distinguish bank- based and market 
based financial systems. A financial system´s most important characteristic is how it aligns 
savings and investment.  
Bank based system 
In a bank based system, savings are transformed into firm investments by using banks as 
intermediaries. Bank based systems prevail in Germany, France and Japan. In a bank based 
financial system retail interest rates should have greater influence on the economy than in a 
market based system, since the pass through from policy interest rates to retail interest rates is 
a more direct one than to corporate bonds (Kaufmann, Scharler; 2006). The yield of a bond is 
determined indirectly by the market. 
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The opposite is true if banks hold close ties to their customers. They are then willing to charge 
lower rates relative to the higher market rates during periods of monetary tightening (Berger, 
Udell; 1992). Consequently, as put forward by Ehrmann et al. (2003), the bank lending 
channel might not show that much reaction to monetary policy, simply because house banks 
smooth liquidity shocks/ lending rates. De Bondt (2005) finds evidence that retail interest 
rates in the euro area are sticky in the short run, but almost completely adjust to policy rates in 
the long run. The banking sector increases them less frequently or in smaller steps. In the 
short run only 50 percent of policy interest rates in the euro area are passed through as 
opposed to 70 percent in the US. 
Mayer (1988, 1990) finds that bank finance is an important source of finance in all countries. 
Consistent with the Pecking Order Theory (Myers, 1984), firms prefer to fund themselves 
with the least risky finance first. This is internal finance. Bank finance comes second. 
Cechetti (2001) reports that 50 percent of all forms of finance in the euro area are bank loans. 
In the US this figure accounts for 20 percent. According to Mishkin (2007, p.257), 
commercial banks´ share of total financial intermediary assets, at the end of 2005, was 30 
percent. 
Market based system 
In a market based financial system markets account for the transfer of savings to firm 
investment. A market based system is faced with informational problems. The agency 
problem manifests itself in the problems of adverse selection and moral hazard. 
Given these informational problems, high risk aversion and uncertainty lead to credit 
rationing by banks in periods of economic downturn. Markets as well as banks show this risk-
averse behaviour. In the presence of high risk aversion, lower policy interest rates from the 
central bank just increase the spread between the policy rate and the interbank rate and 
prevent the pass through to investment, which is risky by definition. 
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II.2.3.1.2.) Cross country differences and the cost channel 
In a paper published in March 2006, Kaufmann und Scharler compare the financial systems of 
the euro area and the United States to explain the role of the cost channel and how it affects 
output and prices.  
Borrowing costs enter the cost function of a firm and influence production plans and prices.  
On an aggregate level the cost of working capital influences output as well as inflation given 
that labour has to be paid prior to production. In the presence of a cost channel, monetary 
contraction results in higher borrowing costs. From a supply side as costs increase aggregate 
supply falls. From the view point of the interest rate channel, as prices increase demand 
shrinks. Households are inclined to postpone consumption due to higher prices, which 
decreases demand. Both consequences amplify the real effects of monetary policy on the 
economy.  
The authors find that the quantitative impact of the cost channel on output is rather limited. 
“The dynamics of the inflation rate” (Kaufmann, Scharler; 2006) are to some extent affected 
by the cost channel, but the response to output appears to be primarily related to aggregate 
demand.  Borrowing costs do play a role in economic output as a reaction to lending rates by 
altering supply. As for inflation the adverse supply shock due to increased costs does not 
show a significant effect because decreased demand partly offsets this effect.  
The authors conclude that the prevailing financial systems across countries do not react 
differently to the supply shock in the setting of the cost channel. In any financial system, the 
persistence of lending rates, which is a characteristic of the very financial system, does not 
explain effects on output. Differences in the financial systems do not appear to be 
heterogeneous enough to show quantifiable cross-country results of the borrowing cost 
transmission mechanism. 
Borrowing costs do not have different effects in a bank based system compared to a market 
based system. That the financial system is an undistinguishable feature in the cost channel 
might stem from the observation that increased costs are smoothed in a bank based system. 
Persistent interest rates in the bank based system compensate for the high degree of bank 
dependence. 
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In periods of economic prosperity a high degree of bank dependence is not so favourable for 
the euro area, while a limited interest rate pass- through as a result of relationship banking in 
periods of economic downturn acts in favour of the euro area. In good economic periods 
external finance via financial markets is easier to get and more widespread in the US market 
based banking system. Interest smoothing renders the lending rate less volatile. In favourable 
times this reduction in risk results in the observation that bank based lending does not pass on 
lower interest rates. 
The implication for the euro area is that the bank lending channel might not be a powerful 
channel of monetary policy despite the background of the house bank principle. Output is 
affected by aggregate demand, and not so much by the more narrow distinction of borrowing 
costs. Aggregate demand depends on the opportunity cost of saving and investing money. 
Borrowing costs enter the payoff function of saving and investment as only one part of the 
aggregate demand function. 
The authors limit the analysis of the cost channel of credit markets for loans to non- financial 
corporations. The present situation of financial crisis is characterised by a credit crunch within 
the financial sector. Thus, implications from the findings need further evidence from 
transmission among financial institutions. 
 
II.2.3.1.3) Cross country differences and the credit channel 
In a paper dated September 2007 Valderrama and Kaufmann (2007) address the issue of the 
transmission of monetary policy, with focussing on the credit channel. They analyse how 
credit aggregates and asset prices reinforce each other and affect output. They estimate a 
model to assess whether there are differences in the transmission mechanism of asset prices 
and loans between a bank based and a market based economy. 
The intuition behind their research is summarized by three working hypothesis. 
- The first hypothesis provides the theoretical models for the reinforcement of credit 
aggregates and asset prices. Among others, Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) show that in the 
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presence of asymmetric information, equity plays a key role as it is used as collateral for 
lending. Lending influences investment. Investment affects asset prices. 
An improvement in the borrower’s net worth, which serves as a collateral for loans, increases 
their creditworthiness and hence their investment prospects. Responding to improved 
investment prospects, asset prices rise. These mutual reinforcing effects may lead to the build 
up of financial imbalances and bubbles. Credits may go beyond what the real economy can 
absorb. Financial imbalances may fuel a boom and are responsible for the bust.  Literature 
(Borio and Lowe, 2002) argues that unsound economic conditions will show up on financial 
markets first and materialize in inflation with a substantial delay. The authors analyse whether 
the cost channel allows for this observation in the data of the US and the euro area. 
- The second hypothesis is the observation of asymmetric dynamics. The theoretical model 
underlying it is the one developed by Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), which relates credit to 
business cycles and asset prices. Asymmetric dynamics imply that reactions to monetary 
shocks vary across the business cycle. Kiyotaki and Moore suggest that asset prices and credit 
aggregates should be modelled in a non linear way since it is observed that the effects of 
monetary shocks are more profound during recessions. The difference in monetary 
transmission throughout the business cycle is reflected in the credit cycle. During economic 
downturns increased default rates and changes in bank lending as well as changed standards 
or monetary contraction cause credit cycles.  
Bernanke and Blinder (1988) assess the asymmetric effects on output that occur at different 
levels of economic activity due to the interest rate elasticity of loan supply; a method 
Kaufmann and Valderrama take on. 
- The third hypothesis relates to the reinforcing effect of asset prices and bank lending with 
respect to the relative importance of equity financing in the US and the euro area. The effects 
of the cost channel are assumed to be stronger in countries with a market based financial 
system, in which external financing plays an important role, as opposed to countries with a 
bank based financial system. In the latter credit is mainly provided by banks. 
To analyse the impact of the credit channel Kaufmann and Valderrama specify more precisely 
the lending conditions. They distinguish between demand and supply driven lending regimes.  
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II.2.3.1.4) Demand driven versus supply driven financial regimes 
Bernanke and Blinder (1988) provided a framework in which monetary shocks have 
asymmetric effects on output depending on the interest rate elasticity of loan supply. The 
interest rate elasticity of loan supply depends on the level of economic activity and thus, 
supply depends on the stage of the business cycle the economy is in. With this in mind, 
Kaufmann and Valderrama distinguish periods in which lending is driven by supply and 
periods in which lending is driven by demand. 
Periods of demand driven supply are characterised by a situation in which the interest 
elasticity of supply for loans is greater than the elasticity of loan demand. In this case, banks 
try to maximize their profit function. According to Kashyap and Stein (1993), loan supply is a 
function of money supply and the rate differential of loans and bonds is the difference in the 
interest rates for loans and commercial paper (bonds). The interest rate is determined by the 
prevailing risk aversion on the markets. If banks are able to charge higher rates on loans, they 
have an incentive to increase the supply of loans.  
This logic is reversed when the economic situation changes and the risk associated with an 
additional outstanding loan cannot be compensated for by higher interest rates. Banks offering 
loans are concerned with the rate they get on the loan and its riskiness. Similarly, the rate 
charged may affect the riskiness of the borrowers. Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) explain this 
phenomenon of credit rationing with the asymmetric information problem of external finance. 
(See discussion on credit rationing, p.38.) 
Under circumstances where economic prospects deteriorate and induce a rise in interest rates, 
the interest elasticity of the supply of loans decreases. If it falls under the elasticity of loan 
demand, the model by Kaufmann and Valderrama classifies the lending regime as supply 
driven. Above a certain threshold of the interest rate, resulting from credit rationing, the loan 
supply curve becomes inelastic (nearly vertical). Hence, the actual amount of loans is 
determined by the supply side. When lending is supply driven it does not react to spending 
and an interest shock sends loan supply into the opposite direction of the rate movement 
(Valderrama, Kaufmann, 2004).  
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It is the other way round in a demand driven lending regime. In a demand driven system an 
increase in the Fed funds rate is expected to be followed by a decrease of bank loans because 
of the money multiplier. This is not necessarily true if demand is still up and cannot be 
satisfied by the bank loans supplied. Thus, creditors search for other ways of finance. It can 
be expected that non-bank sources of credit, such as commercial paper issuances, increase. In 
order to substitute bank finance with other sources of finance, firms must not be restricted by 
their ability to access the markets of non- bank finance. As long as the banks´ are not 
constrained by credit risk limits and reserve requirements they try to maximize their profit 
function by offering more loans. By doing so they compete with firms issuing bonds 
(Kayshap, Stein; 1993). This gives banks an incentive to increase their supply of loans even if 
the interest rate rises. The lending decision thus is left to the demand side. Interest rate shocks 
affect the lending and spending decision by households and firms.  
In order to characterise periods in which asset prices and credit aggregates reinforced each 
other the authors use financial time series from 1980 to 2004. They work with Vector Auto-
regression to estimate a model to define the economic state of the financial system, named 
“regimes”, from the data. The regimes are characterised by relating posterior state 
probabilities to variables in the system. With generalized impulse responses the authors try to 
identify whether a pattern can be found that relates the variables to the economic and credit 
regime (market based versus bank based financial system, demand driven loan supply versus 
supply driven loan supply). 
The model estimated uses five variables, namely GDP, CPI, equity prices (S&P 500 for the 
US and a DataStream Index for the Euro area), lending to the private sector and a 3 month 
interest rate.  
 
The findings  
With the method of generalised impulse responses to describe the dynamics of the data set, 
Kaufmann and Valderama find evidence for the two regimes, regime 1 and regime 2, which 
correspond to a pattern of variables that characterises the state of the economy.  
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Further, they analyse whether a pattern is found that allows for identifying a relation of the 
variables to credit supply and/or the economic foundation. The authors find that the US, as 
well as the euro area, experience a demand- driven, as well as a supply- driven regime during 
the sample period. 
Findings for the Euro area 
The Center of Economic Policy Research defines a recession as “a prolonged period of 
declining growth in the cyclical component of GDP (as measured by the movements in the 
EuroCOIN)”4. For the euro area the authors detect a regime which correlates with the 
business cycle. In regime 1, loans respond to an interest shock negatively. This allows them to 
be characterised as a supply-driven regime. It is observed to prevail at the end of recession 
periods. 
The supply driven regime roughly corresponds to periods of strong economic recovery. Loan 
growth is very low in regime 1. This finding is consistent with the problem of adverse 
selection, where banks are reluctant to give out loans to not so well-known customers in 
periods of high uncertainty. In contrast to the US, corporate lending rates by European banks 
are highly persistent. Liquidity shocks are absorbed to a greater extent in the euro zone as 
European banks smooth retail interest rates (Ehrmann et al.; 2003). Lending is reduced as 
interest rates are raised.  
The analysis does not show any significant response by loans to asset price shocks and vice 
versa. Loans do not affect asset prices significantly. Amplifying effects of asset prices and 
loans on output in the supply driven system are not observed either. The authors conclude that 
financing constraints do not impede economic recovery. In the supply driven system asset 
prices and loans do not reinforce each other and thus do not cause pro-cyclicality.  
In regime 2 the variables indicate a healthy state of the economy. Here, regime 2 is 
characterized by having demand as the driving force. Banks are willing to meet the demand 
for loans; interest rate shocks are insignificant for loans. In the demand driven regime loans 
                                                 
4
 The EuroCOIN is a cross section time series data. 
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react positively to an output shock. They conduct an active strategy, adjusting the interest rate 
to demand by customers and supply from the central bank. In their financial business 
decisions they compete against bond issuance as an alternative to bank loans.  
During demand driven periods, asset prices and loans have a pro-cyclical effect on output. A 
positive asset price shock and a positive loan shock materialize in higher output. At the same 
time, rising asset prices and an increase in loans has an impact on inflation and thus also on 
the price of money, the interest rate. If interest rates go down banks do not lower their lending 
standards, however they do so if interest rates rise above a threshold value. Rising interest 
rates trigger the switch to a supply driven lending regime. The mechanism and the behaviour 
of banks contribute to pre-emptively restrain the build up of financial imbalances due to pro-
cyclicality in early periods of recovery and do not impede economic recovery (Kaufmann, 
Valerrama, 2007). Consistent with earlier findings on the cost channel, borrowing costs do not 
affect output significantly. 
Findings for the United States 
In the US, during recoveries after the Asian crisis and the crisis of Long Term Capital 
Management (LTCM), as well as after 9/11, regimes are also characterised by working with 
the posterior state probabilities of the model’s variables. The authors compare the variables to 
the states of the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) business cycle and 
characterise a regime of economic recovery as regime 1. The regime is not as obviously 
related to the business cycle as it was with the data for the euro area. Relating the 
characteristics to a credit and economic regime, they do not find evidence for supply driven 
lending in regime 1. In regime 1, interest rates are observed to rise, and so are asset prices and 
output. Inflation and lending did not rise. Good economic prospects and low inflation 
expectations correspond to a situation where financial imbalances may build up if asset prices 
reinforce loans. While in regime 1 there is no reinforcement process observed, regime 2 
reveals pro-cyclicality.  
In regime 2, characterised by a pattern of variables that indicates a sound economic state, the 
authors find a positive response of loans to an asset price shock in the short run. Loans 
respond positively to interest rates. This characterises the demand driven regime. In the 
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demand driven regime asset price changes have an effect on lending and vice versa. Monetary 
policy thus improves investment prospects, which manifest themselves in raising asset prices. 
In the data sample GDP rises as well. Shocks in asset prices and loans do not translate into 
higher prices, neither do interest rates rise. This observation can be applied to developments 
in the current financial crisis. 
Inflation was low and stable in past years. Asset prices were steadily increasing and there was 
no end in sight for the favourable economic outlook. But financial imbalances have built up. 
They were not reflected in rising consumer prices, but in asset prices. 
In the US market based system the authors find evidence for a demand driven regime, which 
experienced stronger pro-cyclicality than it did in the euro area. Credit aggregates showed 
stronger reaction to asset prices and vice versa. The cost channel of monetary policy reveals 
itself to be more powerful in terms of effects on asset prices and loans in the US. The effect 
on output shows only marginal differences between the observed countries.  
While in the bank based regime unsound financial development showed up in rising prices, 
this was not necessarily true for the market based system. The authors conclude that as a 
policy advice for the euro area, credit growth can be looked at to indicate future inflation and 
liquidity. 
 
Summarising Cross Country Differences and the Credit Channel 
Asymmetric dynamics do appear differently in a bank and a market based system. During 
recessions credit aggregates in a market based credit environment react stronger to interest 
rate changes than in a bank based system, where retail interest rates are smoothed. A bank 
based system is stronger in counteracting the build up of financial imbalances. 
In a financing environment with a high degree of bank dependence lending behaviour reacts 
to the investment prospects. In a market based system lending behaviour is highly linked to 
asset prices and supports pro-cyclicality. The market based system does not have the 
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automatic switching mechanism that changes the lending behaviour from demand to supply 
driven.  
For both, the euro area and the US, lending standards and borrowing costs do not impact 
output significantly in periods of unsound economic conditions. In a stable environment the 
credit channel becomes more powerful if lending is demand driven. Then, loans and asset 
prices have positive effects on output. 
 
II.2.3.2) Criticism of the bank lending channel 
Meltzer (1995) criticises the bank lending channel by pointing to the question from which 
side the change in bank loans granted comes. The bank lending channel propagates the view 
that the shift in a cyclical change of bank loans is induced by the banks´ willingness to lend. 
An alternative view is to look at the change in bank loans from the demand side. Small firms, 
the type of borrowers most reliant on bank loans, find their businesses most vulnerable in 
economic downturns. Dietsch (2003) finds that credit rationing is only relevant for very small 
firms having unfavourable credit status. Retail interest smoothing may benefit them, but at the 
same time they are the first to be squeezed out of the market. 
Meltzer’s criticism addresses the issue of whether a fall in bank reserves explains the more 
than proportional drop in bank loans.  
The crucial assumption behind the bank lending channel is that banks do not have access to 
any other form of funding loans. In reality, this assumption does not hold true anymore. 
Meltzer (1995) adds that alternative lenders, such as finance companies, credit card debt and 
venture capitalists may substitute bank lending to some extent. Excess demand for funding 
should be met by these alternative sources. Certificates of deposit (CD) and equity issues are a 
vital source of funds for banks. But still, bank demand for deposits and managed liabilities is 
not perfectly elastic (Bernanke, Gertler; 1995).  
 
Given the existence of other sources of financing for a bank to be able to offer loans, Meltzer 
argues that not a fall in bank reserves is responsible for the decline in bank loans, but a fall in  
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asset prices explains the downward path of bank loans. There is no need to put forward a 
separate explanation of bank lending to explain a change in output resulting from monetary 
policy. Not bank loans affect output, but economic prospects reflected in asset prices do. If 
the bank lending channel as a separate channel of monetary transmission were valid, evidence 
from the Great Depression and the credit crunch in the late 1990s should have indicated that. 
In fact, not only bank loans decreased, but also open market commercial paper and bankers´ 
acceptances, which served as supplements and substitutes for bank loans (Meltzer, 1995). 
The discussion of the bank lending channel can be expanded to the consideration of interest 
rate smoothing and credit rationing. 
 
II.4) Interest rate smoothing 
 Berger and Udell (1992) analysed more than a million individual loans in the US over the 
period 1977 to 1988 and found some evidence on commitment lending.  
They find evidence that loans issued under commitment show stickiness in the interest rate 
charged. Sticky loan prices can be explained by “implicit interest rate insurance” banks may 
offer to “risk-averse repeat borrowers”. If banks hold close ties to their customers they are 
willing to charge lower rates relative to the higher market rates during periods of monetary 
tightening. Banks are later compensated for their behaviour when market rates drop to lower 
levels (Fried, Howitt; 1980). Consequently, Berger and Udell, as well as Ehrmann et al. 
(2003) put forward that the bank lending channel might not show that much reaction to 
monetary policy, because house banks react to liquidity shocks by smoothing lending rates.   
When there is relationship banking, interest smoothing partly counteracts the loan supply 
shock induced by lower reserves. But at the same time credit rationing reduces the supply of 
loans by shrinking the pool of borrowers they would lend to.  
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II.5) Credit rationing  
In periods of economic downturn high risk aversion and uncertainty leads to credit rationing. 
One could explain that it is also a mismatch of supply and demand. When demand exceeds 
supply, banks ration the credit they give. When asymmetric information is high, banks limit 
their supply of loan even though they would have enough funds to lend out. Instead of raising 
the interest rate, they change “non- pecuniary terms of the loan contract” (Meltzer, 1995). 
Rationing means, that loan applicants either get a smaller loan at the quoted rate than desired 
or they are denied a loan, as the bank cannot tell whether the applicant is able to meet the 
payments or not. A change in the interest rate does not alter the banks´ behaviour.  
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) explain why banks choose to ration credit instead of simply letting 
the price balance demand and supply. Banks are concerned about the interest rate they get on 
the loans and the risk of not getting paid back. Credit rationing is a reaction to the problem of 
adverse selection. There is a link between higher interest rates and the threat to banks´ 
profitability. The higher the interest rates, the higher the average default risks.  
Clemenz (1986) gives four reasons for why the default risk increases with the interest rate 
charged. At higher interest, riskier projects are offered and less honest customers apply. 
Knowing that their payoff function is unlimited at the positive end and limited in the 
downside, borrowers may turn out to be less able entrepreneurs or put less effort into the 
management of their investment.  
This is the classical problem of risk shifting (Jensen, Meckling; 1976). With an amount of 
debt outstanding that exceeds the critical disciplining value, equity holders are tempted to take 
on riskier projects because they know that their payback is limited by the cash flows that 
accrue. 
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    II.3. EXCHANGE RATE CHANNEL 
In a globalised world monetary policy operates through exchange rates as well. Exchange 
rates affect trade and capital flows. The exchange rate is the price of one country’s currency in 
terms of another country’s currency. The principles that govern the behaviour of other 
financial asset prices, also explain the behaviour of exchange rates (Obstfeld, 2006). Holding 
wealth in the form of an asset is transferring purchasing power from the present to the future. 
The exchange rate thus reflects the expectation of the future level of the rate. 
Martin, Schuknecht and Vansteenkiste (2007) distinguish between the trade channel and the 
international financial channel.  
 
II.3.1) The trade channel 
In a closed economy with floating exchange rates, interest rates drop if expansionary 
monetary policy is conducted. The currency devalues and stimulates net exports. The 
schematic is 
M↑  i↓  E↓  NX↑  Y↑ 
This is exactly what happened in the current crisis. The Fed lowered interest rates and - until 
recently - the US dollar experienced a massive depreciation. The drop in interest rates 
communicated that the economy was in trouble. At the same time the depreciation benefits 
the export sector (Feldstein, 2008) as goods become relatively cheap.  
Interestingly, foreign investors have been financing the US current account deficit despite the 
fact of decreasing interest rates and heavy losses they made on US capital stocks. An analysis 
of this paradox is elaborated in the chapter Global Imbalances. 
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II.3.2) The international financial channel 
Theory states that capital flows to places where returns are expected to be highest. If the 
interest rate is raised, capital flows into the country. The US experience does not follow the 
theoretical argumentation. Recently, despite falling interest rates, capital poured into the US 
as investors are expecting to profit from the competitiveness of the US economy. Under a 
floating exchange rate regime, capital inflows lead to exchange rate appreciation. This raises 
prices. The result is a loss of competitiveness and, possibly, a deterioration of the current 
account balance. 
Mundell (1962) explains capital mobility with the relationship between short term interest 
rates and the exchange rate. The interest parity condition states, that the interest rate 
differential between any two countries determines the exchange rate of these countries. By 
lowering the domestic interest rate dollars become less attractive relative to deposits 
denominated in foreign currencies. This conclusion requires that expected rates of return are 
the same and neglects differences in risk premiums. At the same time as the dollar value 
dropped and prices were beneficial for exports, the low exchange rate translated into higher 
prices for raw materials, most importantly oil.  
Oil exporters have their currencies pegged to the USD. In order to keep the purchasing power 
of raw material suppliers constant, prices of raw materials were raised. This fuels inflation all 
over the world. This development highlights the importance of the exchange rate channel as a 
transmission mechanism. As I will discuss more thoroughly in the chapter Global imbalances, 
the exchange rate is an asset price on financial markets that must not be ignored. It further 
raises the discussion about the responsibility the United States, as the issuer of a reserve 
currency, has for the rest of the world. 
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     II.4. OTHER ASSET PRICE CHANNELS 
II.4.1) Tobin´s q 
Tobin (1969) defines q as the market value of “installed capital” (which is the firm’s market 
value) divided by the replacement cost of capital. The transmission mechanism, which argues 
with Tobin´s q, affects economic activity through the valuation of equities. If the market value 
of a firm is high relative to the replacement costs of a new plant and equipment at the 
prevailing cost of capital, companies can issue new equity relatively cheap. They get more for 
their new shares than the costs of buying new plant and equipment. If Tobin’s q is high, firms 
have an incentive to undertake investments because the financing cost is relatively low. If 
financing costs rise, Tobin’s q falls. Decreasing investment transmits to the real economy. 
M ↓  P equity ↓  Tobin’s q ↓  I ↓  Y↓ 
Corporate finance literature has vastly extended this reasoning by further considerations on 
signalling firms´ prospects (Myers, Majluf; 1984). 
 
II.4.2) Wealth channel 
An alternative channel that operates through equity prices is the wealth channel.  
M ↓  P equity ↓  wealth ↓  consumption ↓  Y↓ 
Modigliani´s (1971) life cycle model states that consumption spending is determined by the 
“lifetime resources of consumers”. The “lifetime resources” are made up of human capital, 
real capital and financial wealth. Common stocks are a key component of financial wealth. A 
decreasing stock price decreases financial wealth and consumption falls. 
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III. FINANCIAL INNOVATION 
 
    III.1 FINANCIAL INSTABILITY HYPOTHESIS 
Minsky (1992) proposed a hypothesis on financial instability. The FIH (financial instability 
hypothesis) links financial market fragility to speculative investment bubbles endogenous to 
capital markets. The theoretical argument underlying the FIH starts with the characterization 
of a capitalist economy which has expanding capital assets and a complex financial system. 
Investment is motivated by the expectation of future profits. Under prosperous conditions, the 
stream of cash flows is sufficient to cover contractual debt obligations as they come due, also 
allowing for safety margins. Minsky (1968) argues that the economic process does not follow 
a “savings - investment” thinking, but rather a sequence that runs from investment demand to 
financing these investments, resulting in income and finally savings. The need to finance 
investment induces “portfolio transformation”, designed to finance accelerating investment 
activity. Minsky argues that in times of prosperity a speculative euphoria develops. When 
corporate cash flow raises beyond what is needed to service the debt, investors take on riskier 
projects until eventually debt outstanding exceeds the credit that borrowers can pay off from 
the revenues they earn. Eventually, lenders call in the loans and asset values become 
vulnerable to collapse. The hypothesis analyses the debt impact on the behaviour of the 
economic system in the normal life cycle of an economy. Minsky defines three distinctive 
income- debt relations for economic units, which are hedge, speculative and Ponzi financing. 
Hedge financing refers to a form of financing where all contractual obligations can be 
serviced by cash flows. Speculative financing means that the economic unit can meet its 
payment commitments on its “income account”. That is they can issue new debt and roll it 
over in order to meet their obligations stemming from maturing debt. 
A Ponzi scheme usually offers abnormally high short-term returns in order to entice new 
investors. The Ponzi scheme advertises high returns by paying off some investors. But this 
system requires a constantly increasing flow of money from investors in order to keep the 
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scheme going. The system is doomed to collapse because the money received by the promoter 
offers no earnings. The basement of this business idea simply is to borrow credit to promote 
fresh investment. 
“[I]f hedge financing dominates then the economy may well be in an equilibrium seeking and 
containing system. In contrast, the greater the weight of speculative and Ponzi finance the 
greater the likelihood of deviations from the equilibrium” (Minsky, 1992). Walras and Smith 
perceive the economy as an “equilibrium seeking and sustaining system”. 
Without relying on external shocks to generate business cycles, the capitalist economy tends 
to engage in speculative and Ponzi finance after “good times” since banking is a profit- 
seeking innovative activity creating bubbles that are not sustainable with the underlying real 
cash flows. As a result of such speculative borrowing bubbles, moral hazard and adverse 
selection induce banks and lenders to tighten credit availability, even to companies that can 
afford loans. This in turn causes the economy to contract. For Minsky, financial complexity 
and the greater involvement of governmental institutions and business firms enable the system 
to limit the downside vulnerability to profits, as well as produce an upside potential in the 
form of inflation. 
Thus, following the logic put forward by Minsky, financial innovation contributes to an 
expanding economy that allows for risk shifting and enables participants to turn illiquid assets 
into liquid instruments. The system is prone to implode one day. 
 
III.2. NEW CONFIGURATION OF PLAYERS 
Borio (2007) analyses change and constancy in the financial system and points out that the 
configuration of the players in the financial system has changed. He highlights three 
dimensions. The distinction among different types of financial intermediaries has been 
blurred. There is a tendency for greater consolidation among the different business segments. 
Borio uses the terms “atomisation of risk” (Knight, 2007) and “marketisation of finance” to 
describe the developments in the financial industry. 
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Competing for investors´ savings, financial institutions expanded their asset management 
volume in order to remain in the market. This transition for traditional intermediaries, such as 
banks, is a step away from an “originate and distribute”- strategy towards a strategy relying 
on market incentives. This process is termed “disintermediation”. Relationship lending was 
thus transferred to the markets. At the same time banks gave up their informational advantage 
built on relationship. Both, commercial and investment banking, as well as banking and 
insurance extended their competences. 
Redrado (2007) points out, that improvements in information technologies facilitated quality 
assessment of the securities offered on capital markets. Statistical methods to assess credit 
risk made banks loose part of their comparative advantage by reducing information and 
transaction costs for non-bank financial intermediaries. Growing counterparty risk is due to 
this growing “symbiosis between markets and intermediaries” (Borio, 2007).    
Intermediaries and markets are highly complementary in their task of providing a functioning 
financial system. Intermediaries, such as banks, have become increasingly reliant on markets 
guaranteeing their operational businesses. The market provides them the necessary tools for 
their risk management, namely hedging possibilities. In return markets benefit from the 
market making service of the intermediaries as well as their liquidity funding.  
“The same capital base can ultimately support operation of both markets and intermediaries” 
(Borio, 2007). The drawback of this development is that counterparty risk increased 
simultaneously. The most recent happenings show that the very investors in many cases were 
institutional investors, covering a wide range from investment banks to pension funds.  
  
III.2.1) Banks as providers of liquidity 
Traditionally, banks borrowed short-term and lent long-term. They borrowed liquid and lent 
illiquid.  
On the liability side of a banks’ balance sheet there are deposits, which are withdraw able on 
demand. Loans to businesses and households were the major entry on the asset side. Typically 
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banks held those loans until maturity. This classical balance sheet structure, referred to as the 
‘originate and hold’ model, is inherently vulnerable to bank runs by deposit holders. The bank 
adds value by transforming maturities and creating liquidity (Niehans, 1987). The liquidity 
preference theory (Hicks, 1935) states that investors prefer the less risky short term fixed 
income instruments to long term investments. Borrowers do have the need for longer term 
finance.  Banks´ function is to transform the maturities of investments to match demand and 
supply. Banks´ deposits were the key part of the source of funding for households and non-
financial corporations, because banks played the central role in the clearing and settlement of 
large-scale transactions and of securities.  
Financial innovation now made it possible to deviate from this “originate and hold” concept 
to a new strategy which allows for an increase in the allocation of funds. Advances in modes 
of securitisation created products, such as mortgage backed securities. These new products 
brought with them a new configuration of players on financial markets and simultaneously 
changed the information content of prices and the perception of risk. Financial innovation 
seeks to make better use of cash or capital reserves by lowering cash holding, working with 
higher leverage and holding lower equity capital buffers, which constitutes a changed 
environment for monetary policy. However, it also increased potential risk in the case of a 
credit market downturn. 
 
    III.3. SECURITIZATION 
“Most financial innovations in over-the-counter derivatives involve new ways to disperse risk. 
…[O]ur constantly changing financial environment supplies a steady stream of new 
opportunities for innovation to address market imperfections….[R]egulation is not only 
unnecessary in these markets, it is potentially damaging, because regulation presupposes 
disclosure and forced disclosure of proprietary information can undercut innovations in 
financial markets just as it would in real estate markets.”  
Alan Greenspan (2004) before the Society of Business Economists, London   
      
 
46 
 
Definition of Securitization 
Securitization is the process of converting nonmarketable credit instruments into publicly 
traded securities. Mortgage-backed securities are an example of a securitized credit 
instrument. The basic idea of securitisation is to turn illiquid portfolios into liquid assets. 
Lenders get the possibility to move interest risk off their balance sheets, and move it on as a 
liquid asset to investors. ‘Originate and distribute’ became a new attractive model for banks. 
For their servicing function they are paid a fee.  
In the 1938, the private corporation Fannie Mae, the Federal National Mortgage Association, 
and Ginnie Mae (Government National Mortgage Association) were founded. These 
associations service a secondary market for mortgages insured by the Federal Housing 
Administration. They buy mortgages from banks, package them to mortgage based securities 
and resell them to investors. In the 1970s another mortgage corporation joined the stage 
Freddie Mac, the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation. These listed associations are 
backed by the government and smoothed the rates for mortgage loans across the USA. They 
started with securitizing residential mortgages. Before the Great Depression in the 1930s, 
home mortgages were often short- term, non- amortizing loans with a balloon payment due 
when the loan matured. During the Great Depression households were to a large extent not 
able to repay their loans or get them refinanced. Unemployment resulted in a sharp increase of 
delinquent mortgages. The 1968 Charter Act responded to this situation by allowing banks to 
create mortgage backed securities. The intent was to allow banks to give out more long term 
loans. This could be achieved by enabling banks to sell off mortgages, thus freeing up funds 
to lend to more homeowners.  
Equivalent to mortgage backed securities in the U.S., German and Austrian banks have long 
been emitting “Pfandbriefe”, a vital source of bond finance on the private debt market. 
Asset securitisation involves the creation of debt securities. The interest and principle 
payments of these debt securities are serviced with an income generating pool of assets. By 
pooling these cash flow generating assets, the cash flow streams can be used to finance the 
payments on the “new” debt instrument. The originator of the debt instrument assumes a 
regular stream of payments of the underlying asset to service the debt.                  
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Financial institutions and businesses of all kinds use securitization to immediately realize the 
value of a cash-producing asset. In the process of securitisation the originator passes through 
the interest and principle payments of the underlying assets to investors on the stock market. 
The originator (the bank or institution) thus receives the payment stream of the assets as a 
lump sum rather than spread out over time.  
Securitisation involves the creation of a special purpose vehicle. This vehicle, which might be a 
trust or a company, finances the purchase of the assets in the pool by the issue of bonds. The 
bonds in return are secured by those assets. This procedure allows the originator to get the 
loans off the balance sheet. Moving an asset off the balance sheet, while simultaneously 
increasing income, has a positive effect on ROA (return on assets), a measure indicating how 
efficient management is using its assets to generate earnings),  and demonstrates to investors a 
more efficient use of capital. Banks realize a unique advantage from securitization. Removing 
loans from their balance sheet can lower regulatory capital requirements, or the amount and type 
of capital banks must hold given the size of their loan portfolio (Cowan, 2003). Duffie (2007) 
notes, that the total risk to be borne remains with the financial system as a whole, but it allows 
banks to diversify their risk and hold less of it on their balance sheets. The advantage of the 
credit risk transfer is, that it enables banks to transfer risk out of the banking system to 
institutions that “are not as critical as banks for the provision of liquidity” (Duffie, 2007). In 
effect, however, the reserve ratio of the financial system is reduced. 
The ability to pass through loan payments was a great innovation on credit markets. Before 
securitisation, selling and buying of loans were transactions on a relatively illiquid market. 
For home mortgage lenders holding an illiquid loan portfolio is unattractive, since lenders 
have to bear the exposure to higher interest rates which might exceed their interest income. 
This risk exposure turned out to be disastrous in the Savings and Loan Crisis of the 1980s.  
 “The fundamental goal of all securitization transactions is to isolate the financial assets 
supporting payments on the backed securities. Isolation ensures that payments associated with 
the securities are derived solely from the segregated pool of assets and not from the originator 
of the assets.” (Cowan, 2003) Investment banks are the intermediaries between the originator 
of the asset pool and the investor. They bear the risk of buying the newly created bonds and 
having them in their portfolio until they sell them on to investors.                                                         
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Private institutions, especially banks, immediately took advantage of these techniques to 
liquefy their illiquid loans.  
  
Benefits of Securitisation 
The existence of a secondary market for mortgages enables financial institutions to set free 
fresh capital through the sale of loans. This capital can be re- deployed in form of new loans. 
This strategy lowers borrowing costs for households and firms applying for credit. Securitized 
bonds were considered less risky than corporate debt instruments, since securitized bonds had 
as an underlying security, a pool of assets. However, the implicit assumption was that those 
assets, e.g. residential housing, would never fall in the value and were therefore risky. 
Geographic dispersion is another advantageous effect of securitisation. Traditionally, banks 
borrowed in those areas where they got deposits. With the creation of Freddie Mac all regions 
could be serviced at an equal lending rate. Estrella (2002) analyses the development of 
securitised debt on European markets and finds that this form of financial innovation was 
increased with the configuration of players at the time of the introduction of the euro as a 
currency.  
As Cowan (2003) points out, another benefit of the innovation was said to be the contribution 
to market efficiency, since a wider range of investors was supposed to be able to demand the 
appropriate risk premium. An increase in market completeness would support long- term 
growth prospects. The separation of risk and its shifting is of importance as well. Financial 
institutions can shift their credit risk on to investors and reduce theirs, thus being less 
vulnerable to systemic risk. 
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Problems with Securitisation 
The problems associated with securitisation are most likely to be generally associated with the 
creation of off-balance sheet vehicles: 
Securitisation increased the opportunities for risk trading and shifting. On the one hand 
securitisation made it possible to hedge risk better. But on the other hand it also permitted 
investors to seek out and take on additional risk (hedging, open positions).  The new risk-
trading opportunities are enhanced through the creation of innovative instruments or 
institutions. Since these instruments have become too complicated to be able to trace them 
back to what the underlying assets are, the risk inherent to it is hard to estimate. Indeed the 
number of subprime mortgages increased. 
From the viewpoint of asymmetric information the ‘originate and distribute’ model destroys 
information compared to the ‘originate and hold’ model. The incentive for collecting 
sufficient information gets lost at the level of the originator of the assets when loans become 
securities. Knowing that the loan will be sliced and sold off to another institution the loan 
officer’s incentive for information gathering is reduced. The loan officer as the agent of the 
lending bank works for a vehicle that is not shown on the originator’s balance sheet after the 
securitisation. The incentive of monitoring the borrower and his risk taking and eventually 
exit the lending relationship in a timely manner is lessened (Duffie, 2007). Reputation 
considerations will eventually mitigate this problem, but will not eliminate it. 
Moreover, investors do not have the possibility to access the information the loan originator 
had. Thus, arguing that efficiency is improved by the investor’s decision to buy, hold or sell 
the asset or mortgage backed security is hard to believe since information cannot be 
transmitted effectively to investors. The chain of parties involved in the deal before the bond 
having reached the investors has become longer than in the past. In the end, neither the buyer 
nor the seller will know what assets are backing the security traded. 
The complexity of instruments makes it hard to measure the value of an instrument and its 
exposure to risk. Taking banks and the special purpose vehicles together, the proportion of 
reserve assets to total lending has decreased. Lending has altogether become riskier. 
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III.3.1) Collateral Debt Obligations 
Starting with this rather simple approach of making loans liquid through securitisation, 
financial innovation and technological advances brought about the creation of increasingly 
complex instruments.  
In the 1980s, mortgage-backed securities known as collateralized mortgage obligations 
(CMOs) were created. Typically, the underlying collateral for a CMO is either a pool of 
mortgages or a mortgage pass-through security. CMOs are created by carving up the cash 
flow from the underlying asset into various categories, or tranches, with different maturity or 
risk characteristics. Investors can then purchase the obligation that best suits their appetite for 
risk and/or duration. 
 
    III.4. FINANCIAL INNOVATION AND MONETARY POLICY 
III.4.1) Marketisation of finance 
Financial innovation has created new uncertainties in the transmission channels of monetary policy. 
It may have weakened some channels and strengthened some others. At least in normal times, 
financial innovation significantly weakens the bank-lending channel. Securitisation gives 
firms broader access to capital markets and, as such, makes them less dependent on bank 
funding. Similarly, banks may be more able to issue debt securities and less dependent on the 
constraint of funding themselves with secured deposits. At the same time, however, 
securitisation strengthens the “direct” transmission channel through which interest rates 
operate, since a great number of financial intermediaries are more dependent on liquidity and 
on its price.  
 
Altunbas, Gambacorta and Marqués (2007) show that securitisation is positively linked to 
bank lending. The bank lending channel as a transmission mechanism of monetary policy has 
decreased due to the emergence of securitisation. But in any case, the supply of loans is not 
completely insulated by the effects of securitisation. 
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III.4.2) Procylicality  
Financial innovation – to the extent that it makes it easier to take risks and encourages the 
“search for yield” – may have increased the impact of monetary policy because, in such an 
environment, risk premiums are highly pro-cyclical and move in tandem with interest rates. 
This same pro-cyclicality of “risk taking” can lead to busts when investors risk appetite 
changes. 
 
III.4.3) Financial Innovation and the Balance sheet channel 
Securitisation facilitated access to residential mortgage by easing credit constraints since 
credit risk could be separated and sold off. Demand for housing increased and so did the 
prices on the housing market. Rising home equity serves as collateral for further lending and 
thus finances consumer spending. The collateral in place reduces the information problems as 
collateral, that can be valued and recycled, can decrease the lender’s losses in case the 
borrower defaults.  
The question is to what extent housing wealth translates to the real economy and to what 
extent it alters the aggregate demand for money, which is the crucial figure the central bank 
has to control in order to manage the stated aims of price stability and employment. And 
moreover how should central banks react to house price appreciation? Should it burst the 
bubble or simply react to it bursting?   
When bubbles burst, e.g. house prices fall, they threaten financial stability and increase the 
demand for liquidity. This affects the central bank’s target variables, such as price stability 
and output by destroying wealth. 
First, the argument that the central bank should burst bubbles would imply that it knows when 
there is a bubble. It would require perfect information to be able to determine at what stage of 
the business cycle an economy is. It would also require that the central bank has an 
informational advantage over private markets (Greenspan, 2002). By bursting a bubble at the 
wrong moment a lot of value could be destroyed. 
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Mishkin (2007) emphasises that uncertainty about the effect of interest rates on bubbles is too 
great to be able to deflate a bubble without doing much harm. This argument is in line with 
Greenspan´s view of addressing a bubble’s consequences rather than the bubble itself. In 
addition, very few analysts before late 2007 expected house prices actually to fall.  
Mishkin (2007) also points out that uncertainty around how house prices affect consumer 
spending is quite high. Dyman, Elmendorf and Sichel (2005) argue that advances in mortgage 
finance allow consumers to smooth their consumption by borrowing on their home equity. 
The authors show that consumption in the US was less sensitive to income shocks since the 
mid- 1980s when innovations in housing finance evaporated.  Mishkin (2007) summarises 
that the reaction of consumption to income has been reduced through financial innovation, but 
emphasizes that this weaker link between consumption and income, does not imply a 
smoothing of consumption to interest- rates in general. In the case of strongly deteriorating 
income expectations, financial innovation cannot prevent consumption from decreasing. 
Hodges (2007) provides data for the decreasing debt productivity of US credits by stressing 
that the credit to GNP ratio has risen from 1.86 percent in 1957 to 4.60 percent in 2006. This 
means $4.60 of debt for each dollar of national income. Thus, US credit expansion in the past 
few years was matched by a declining growth in GNP.  A huge portion of US debt is owed to 
foreigners. 
This means that the interest channel, although it might affect incomes, does not transmit to 
consumption when mortgages are easily available. Consequently, in countries with developed 
mortgage markets, consumer spending shows higher correlation with house prices than what 
can be observed in countries with less developed mortgage markets (Calza, Monacelli, 
Stracca; 2007). The US has a developed mortgage market, whereas in Italy, for example, the 
legal environment is not so favourable for the mortgage market due to lengthy and expensive 
procedures to repossess collateral. 
The interest channel is of importance if mortgage interest payments are variable. The amount 
of residential mortgages thus is sensitive to changes in short term interest rates. Concerning 
securitisation, Estrella (2002) finds that a higher level of securitisation causes the market for 
residential mortgages to be more closely linked to capital markets. His findings show that 
liquidty and credit volume effects cause the response of mortgage interest rates to changes in 
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policy rates. Thus the liquidity (cost channel) and credit channel have a strong influence on 
the transmission of monetary policy when securitisation is in place. 
The effect of securitisation, namely greater loan supply is linked to the business cycle. A 
bank’s risk profile and its liquidity demand significantly impacts the supply of loans. The 
riskiness of the loan portfolio decreases the bank’s capacity to lend. Mishkin concludes from 
these studies (Estrella, 2002) that securitisation has the potential to strengthen the interest rate 
channel. But as I will discuss in the chapter on transmission mechanisms, the criticism to the 
interest channel in general is that policy interest rates are not always transmitted to the real 
economy if liquidity on market is scarce and risk is high. 
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IV. GLOBAL IMBALANCES 
 
The balance of payments measures both payments to and receipts from foreigners. 
Transactions resulting in wealth transfers between countries enter the current account. The 
current account measures a country’s net exports of goods and services relative to its net 
imports. Besides the trade component changes in foreign indebtedness, which measure the 
size and direction of international capital flows, are the second component that are part of the 
balance of payments. In an economy without foreign investment, the current account equals 
income minus spending, which is saving. In an open economy the economy can either save by 
building up its capital stock or by acquiring foreign wealth. The US is currently experiencing 
an excess of imports over exports as well as a high degree of foreign credit, which translates 
into an excess of investment over saving. 
The US current account deficit currently accounts for US$699 billion, equivalent to about 
4.7% of GDP. The US soaks up about 80% of the combined current account surpluses of 
Germany, Japan, China and all other surplus countries of the world5. In absolute terms, 
Germany ($272bn) and Japan ($206bn) together account for a much larger share of global 
surpluses than China ($372bn) does. Relative to GDP, China’s current account surplus 
accounts for 8.5%, compared to 3.9% and 6.5% for Japan and Germany, respectively. For 
Saudi Arabia this number is 33.1%. Brazil and India have current account deficits of 1.6% 
and 2.9% of GDP, respectively. 
The current situation results from heavy US debt borrowing paired with heavy equity lending 
(Obstfeld, Rogoff; 2005).  The US has had the remarkable ability to pay a lower rate of 
interest than asset earnings yielded. In the longer run, the prevailing financial imbalances did 
not serve the US, and does collateral damage also to the rest of the world. With “borrowed 
liquidity from debt creation” (Moneyweek) on hand, the US consumed more than would 
                                                 
5
 Data from The Economist, October 11th; Q2 2008. 
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match up with the means it actually had. In the remainder of this section I will discuss 
possible reasons for the process of international leveraging. 
 
    IV.1.  LOW GLOBAL INTEREST RATES 
The Greenspan Put, as well as an investment environment of low global interest rates, 
contributed to a booming period on the back of financial balances. Kindleberger (1965) 
speaks of the US as the “world banker”. The “world banker” is taking short term deposits in 
the form of US Treasury bills and foreign reserves and invests long term in foreign equity. 
Figure 6 depicts foreign holdings of US Treasury bills. Japan ranks first, followed by China. 
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Figure 6:  Foreign holdings of US Treasury Securities 
The United States possesses the comparative advantage of being able to generate financial 
assets that others want to hold (Frankel, 2006). Advantageous for the US is that the rest of the 
world relies on the assumption that the dollar remains the reserve currency and will be the 
destination of the “flight to quality” in crises around the world (see Figure 2, Ted spread). 
Especially in the period 2001-2007, low global interest rates enabled investors to borrow 
cheaply. Since 1982, using cheap external finance, the US financed its growing current 
account deficit. 
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Over the last 15 years, interest rates have declined to levels not seen since the 1970s. Real 
interest rates of almost all classes of long term bonds have been low (Bank of Canada; 2007). 
Corporate bonds have yielded lower risk premia after the stock market crash in 2001. 
Emerging markets´ high yield bonds also paid a relative low risk premium compared to 
historical price earnings ratios (Ahrend, 2006). This indicates falling risk premia relative to 
equity. Since the start of the financial market crisis this situation has reversed completely. 
Risk premia have risen dramatically. 
The world interest rate – defined as the common component of interest rates of the G7 in a 
paper by Desroches and Francis (2007) – had been reflected in a decrease in real interest rates 
to levels slightly above two percent after 2001. For periods that are not highly inflationary this 
number constitutes a historic low. The costs of arranging a relationship between the creditor 
and the debtor, as well as the uncertainty about the future interest rate would limit the interest 
rate from falling below the lower boundary of about 2 to 2.5 percent (Keynes, 1936, p. 183). 
Financial integration of capital markets has led global national interest rates to move in 
common.  
The determinants of the interest rate are demand and supply for funds. A low interest rate thus 
can be explained by identifying sources of a change in savings and /or investment. The debate 
centres on whether low savings or a low level of investment contributed more to the situation 
of low global interest rates. 
 
IV.1.1) Investments 
Investment demand by G7 countries has reached a low level (Rajan, 2006). Various 
developments contribute to excess investment capacity of the major developed countries. 
Desroches and Francis (2007) adopt a longer term perspective to explain the falling real 
interest rates over the past 15 years. They find a significant relationship between investment 
demand and growth in the labour force. A declining labour force in industrialized countries 
thus is reflected in a weaker global investment demand. Demographics in Europe, Japan, 
Canada and the US would match this link between low interest rates and a decrease in 
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investment demand. At the same time the major industrial countries face high capital-to-
labour ratios, which diminish the expected return on the investment.  
While investment demand in the developed world decreases, emerging markets demand is 
rising. Growth in productivity and industrial production are found to be factors to which 
investment demand reacts positively. Paradoxically, many market players financially invest in 
the US. Desroches and Francis argue that Tobin’s q (market value relative to replacement 
costs) plays an important role and associate stock market returns with higher investment 
demand.  
Risk aversion in the aftermath of the stock market crash in March 2000 was high and reduced 
equity investment. Nonetheless, investors were searching for yield. Demand for corporate 
bonds and emerging market sovereign debt vehicles increased, narrowed spreads and 
contributed to low interest rates. Moreover, more risk averse institutional investors shifted 
their portfolio composition towards bonds. 
Emerging markets have large growth opportunities, but not so much the ability to locally 
generate the store of value instruments (Frankel, 2006). They demand saving instruments 
from developed capital markets and their investment requires funding from foreign markets. 
The US, in particular, took over the role of an intermediary aligning the demand for 
investment with the funding supply. As a consequence of its unique role in international 
economics the US could benefit from positive investment performance of foreign assets, 
while at the same time profiting from low costs to finance its foreign equity holdings. 
Coupled with an expanding foreign leverage, US residents enjoyed this rate of return 
advantage (Obstfeld, Rogoff; 2005). Substantial capital gains were made due to the 
appreciation of foreign currencies relative to the US dollar and the return on foreign direct 
investment (FDI) and equity (Frankel, 2006). Lane and Milesi-Feretti (2005) provide data for 
those valuation effects.  
Figure 7 shows the proportion of US FDI in the rest of the world in billions of dollars. The 
European Union ranks first in terms of receiving direct investment from the US. This outward 
direct investment is complemented by inward investment from the rest of the world. Figure 8 
depicts this reversal of investment flows by showing the inflow of Chinese wealth to US T-
bills. 
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                         Figure 7: US Foreign Direct Investment, data source: Thomson Datastream 
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Figure 8:  Chinese holdings of US Treasury Securities from 2000 till 2008 in billions of US dollars,  
Source: Thomson Datastream 
 
IV.1.2) Savings 
Bernanke (2005) speaks of the forces of a “global savings glut” that help explain the current 
account deficit in the US and the low interest rates. In this version, the rest of the world 
wanted to keep their savings in US dollars. The low interest US government bond yields can 
be traced back to portfolio shifts and the fiscal-monetary policy mix of the countries involved. 
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    IV.2. THE GREENSPAN PUT 
A put option is used as insurance by investors against a drop in the price of a security below a 
certain threshold. In financial markets, the belief that the Federal Reserve is going to 
intervene in favour of Wall Street if stocks or bonds threaten to fall significantly is called the 
Greenspan Put. 
Alan Greenspan was chairman of the US Federal Reserve (Fed) from 1987 to 2006. 
Greenspan conducted monetary policy under President Ronald Reagan, George H.W. Bush, 
Bill Clinton, and George W. Bush.  Beginning with Paul Volcker, the Fed in the 80s focused 
on keeping inflation in check and managed to do so. 
Greenspan forcefully stood behind the perception that asset prices determine GDP. Aware of 
the meaningful contribution of monetary policy “to the impressive performance” of the US 
American economy (Greenspan, 2004) his monetary policy added not only to the booms but 
also to the bust the economy is currently experiencing. 
Greenspan rejected rigid frameworks and “simple linear functions” (Greenspan, 2004). He 
was aware of the incomplete knowledge about complex linkages in the economy, which 
central bankers face. In his point of view, precisely specified models that try to quantify risk 
and uncertainty are not able to capture the full set of parameters that influence the economy. 
He tended to more flexible and adaptable monetary policy, which brought him the reputation 
of a practitioner.  
His management style adapted elements of risk management, knowing that the structure of 
parameters used is constantly changing, which is highlighted by Bernanke (2004) saying that 
“[t]he channels of monetary policy, consequently, are changing in tandem”. 
Greenspan´s “insurance policy” (Blinder, Reis; 2004) went into action in 1998 during the 
events of the Russian crisis and the collapse of Long Term Capital Management (LTCM). 
The Fed organised a rescue of LTCM, a large US hedge fund. LTCM was perceived to be 
“too big to fail” since a failure of the hedge fund was feared to have the potential to disrupt 
financial markets. Many Wall Street and foreign banking firms had a stake in LTCM and 
were concerned about a widespread impact on counterparties. The bailout of LTCM sent a 
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positive signal to the stock market. Critics argue that this “too big to fail” doctrine induces 
moral hazard. Fisher (1999) points out that both managers and investors are subject to 
excessive risk taking due to the implicit guarantee of the lender of last resort. 
A central bank’s task is to avoid panic on the markets and keep prices stable and 
unemployment low. The difficulty of accomplishing this task is to make the right judgements 
about the state of institutions. The critical point is to determine “the line between solvency 
and liquidity” (Fisher, 1999). A lender of last resort can reduce panic on the market if it is 
skilled enough to determine whether a particular institution is suffering from temporary 
illiquidity or would be insolvent in normal times. If a crisis is well managed, the number of 
bankruptcies is likely to be small. If a crisis is badly managed, general illiquidity and 
insolvency may result.  
Greenspan justified his reaction of easing of monetary policy in the event of LTCM with the 
concern about “the low probability risk that the default might trigger events that would 
severely disrupt domestic and international financial markets” (Greenspan, 2004). 
Greenspan´s opinion on operating under a risk management paradigm implied that at times it 
would be required to take actions that guarded against possible, if improbable, outcomes that 
could have severe adverse effects on the economy. Suspicious about the models employed, he 
argues that models that are designed to meet specific policy objectives could in practice prove 
to be unsuitable and cause severe adverse outcomes (Greenspan, 2004). 
With this reasoning Greenspan also defended his policy of low interest rates after 2001, 
pointing out that the US experienced an “exceptionally mild recession, even milder than a 
decade ago” (Greenspan, 2004) in the aftermath of the savings and loan crisis.  
Critics of Greenspan put forward that the Fed was providing psychological insurance by 
cutting the interest rate in support of the stock market. Fed policy did not allow a substantial 
devaluation and thus encouraged excessive risk taking.   
Governor Donald Kohn (2004), vice chairman of the board of governors at the Federal 
Reserve, explains the Fed´s reaction to the bursting bubble in 2000 with the problem of falling 
asset prices. Falling asset prices deteriorate the stability of the financial markets and constrain 
loan possibilities and spending. In order to stop the flight of liquidity that could disrupt 
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financial markets and economic activity, confidence building policy actions are taken. These 
include a decrease in interest rates to lower the probability of the high impact event of an 
asset price correction. 
 
IV.2.1) Falling Risk Premia 
Miller, Weller, Zhang (2001) study to what extent the market changes the risk premium on 
the US stock market in response to Fed policy. They assume that if investors observe 
“asymmetric policy interventions,” they will believe that the central bank puts a floor under 
falling market prices. This is because the Fed (then under Greenspan) is a strong advocate of 
not bursting the bubbles, but reacting to their consequences. The Fed therefore tries to 
stabilize the market by building confidence (Kohn, 2004). The central bank’s reaction acts as 
a put option insuring against downside risk. In the theory of Miller, Weller and Zhang, the put 
is available without cost, but the insurance is priced into the stock market in the form of 
higher prices. Higher stock prices and low risk premia mean that the cost of equity has 
decreased. Using the framework of Tobin’s q, equity can buy relatively more than when 
security prices are down. Bernanke (2004) explains the decline in the cost of equity by the 
decrease in economic volatility.  
My calculations of the volatility using the model of the equally weighted moving average 
(EWMA volatility) underline this fact. For the period 2003 to mid-2007, when the crisis 
reached broad capital markets, volatility was less than one percent for daily data (See Figure 
8). Such low risk reduces the premia.  
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Figure 9:  EWMA volatility of stock market index S&P 500; Data source: Thomson Datastream 
 
McKinnon and Pill (1996) show that financial innovation together with an implicit deposit 
insurance, has the ability to fuel lending and exacerbate boom-bust cycles. Greenspan is 
criticised for focussing on wealth effects and consequently for conducting a policy that 
combats market declines. He advocates that prices of stocks, bonds, and real estate as well as 
the exchange rate support the Fed in achieving its objective of price stability for consumer 
goods, which should increase macroeconomic stability and growth in general. Liquidity gives 
investors confidence that their assets can be sold at any time. Investors perceive this as a 
safeguard. On the liquidity paradox, Keynes (1936) wrote that the individual investor’s belief 
of being able to exit the market at will “calms his nerves and makes him much more willing to 
run a risk”. This creates the problem of moral hazard. Excessive risk taking because of 
perceived safety takes place when the potential loss is so great that the “insurer” (the central 
bank) is not able to provide enough liquidity to calm the market. High risk aversion forces the 
market players to leave the market and abandon investment, resulting in illiquidity.  
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IV.2.2) Implications of the “insurance policy” for the rest of the world  
Coming to the Trinity Problem of Mundell (2000a), during the Greenspan era the external 
balance was not an objective for monetary policy considerations. Until 2007, the US 
developed an economic environment of low unemployment and low inflation, as well as a 
stable exchange rate towards its main trading partners. The latter is not an achievement of US 
monetary policy, but rather the fact of quasi dollar pegs in Asian and oil exporting countries 
until 2006. The US had established a stable environment, while the current account deficit 
widened dramatically.  
Greenspan (2004) once pointed out that his task is to conduct monetary policy with a sole 
focus on the US. His responsibility for domestic policy goals only understated the risk of a 
growing current account deficit. Unsound developments on domestic markets could easily 
spread risk aversion and induce a reversal of capital inflows. Liquidity then becomes scarce 
and, as asset prices drop, the “vicious cycle” (Kaminsky, Reinhart; 1999) of wealth effects 
continues to deteriorate output.  
While the external balance deteriorated, the internal balance was sound. In its open economy, 
the US increased liquidity on the market, helping asset prices without affecting inflation or 
consumer prices. Stock market prices inflated, whereas the consumer price index did not 
overshoot the inflation target.  
 
IV.2.3) Flattening of the Philips Curve 
In the 1960s, economists pursued the idea of a permanent inflation-unemployment trade-off. 
The inverse relation of unemployment and inflation no longer matches reality. Iakova (2007) 
calls this development the “flattening of the Phillips curve”. 
The Philips curve describes the rate of unemployment and inflation as an inverse relationship. 
Usually, if an economy is overworking its resources, inflation rises since production and 
labour costs increase. The output gap, which constitutes the difference between the actual and 
the efficient (or potential) output, is a way to measure aggregate demand over aggregate 
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supply as an indicator of expected inflation and unemployment. The efficient output is the 
level where the economy works at full employment.  
Iakova analyses inflation in the UK and argues that globalisation is responsible for the 
flattening of the Phillips curve. She puts forward three reasons for abandoning the Philips 
curve, namely increased competition, labour mobility (and the shifting of production abroad 
at a high cost) and increased trade and investment flows. In an open economy, a change in 
domestic demand can easily be satisfied through an increase in imports and a shift of 
production abroad.  Demand pressure does not show up in higher prices for manufactured 
goods, but is still a reliable indicator for service price inflation. Consequently, domestic 
inflation may become less sensitive to a positive domestic output gap and more sensitive to 
global tensions on production capacities (Noyer, 2008). Heightened competition from a 
globalised world was thwarting producers’ ability to pass through cost increases in the past 
few years. Developed countries imported cheap manufactured goods. The drop in import 
prices allowed real consumption wages to increase while real production wages remained 
unaffected. This has lowered the inflation rate at any given level of employment. In addition 
to the benefits of low inflation, competition on product and labour markets was a further 
feature of globalisation. 
Expansionary policy after the stock market crash in 2000 and 2001 added to the effect of 
already low interest rates compared to the past. The Fed´s decision to support growth kept 
interest rates below what is now considered the natural rate of interest. In 2001 the concern 
was more that the US economy would experience deflation. According to the definition of 
“the neutral rate of interest” the goal of price stability was achieved by mid- 2003.  
The neutral rate of interest is defined as the rate at which the demand for physical loan capital 
coincides with the supply of savings expressed in physical magnitudes (Wicksell, 1965). Once 
the neutral rate is reached, equilibrium is attained. In this equilibrium framework the balance 
of supply (savings) and demand (loans) keeps prices stable. 
The Fed constantly increased the money supply. As Figure 10 shows, policy rates were kept 
low until 2006. The loose monetary policy in the past years served as spending stimulus and 
is said to have worsened the current account deficit. Saving rates of US households dropped 
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to negative and near negative levels. The US stock market experienced an upward trend 
through 2001, with risk premia falling below historic levels. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10: Federal Funds Target Rate from 1999 to 2008 
The US fostered growth knowing that asset prices would affect output. The problem of the 
commitment to wealth effects is that if domestic investment is not matched with domestic 
savings, a current account imbalance occurs. 
 
    IV.3. PORTFOLIO SHIFTS 
IV.3.1) “War chest of reserves” 
Painful economic crises induced emerging economies to increase their savings rate in order to 
reduce their vulnerability to opportunistic capital flows. Mexico in 1994, East Asia from 
1997-98, Russia in 1998, Brazil in 1999 and Argentina in 2002 were highly dependent on 
foreign capital lending prior to the financial crisis.  Precautionary reserve accumulation in the 
wake of these crises turned developing countries form borrowers to lenders on a large scale 
on international capital markets. Export-led growth in Korea, Thailand and China vastly 
contributed to the accumulation of dollar reserves.  
In the view of Deutsche Bank, advanced by Dooley and Garber, Chinese authorities needed to 
maintain a de facto dollar peg to preserve the economy’s competitiveness on the export 
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market. But since 2006, the Chinese currency has appreciated against the dollar. Tyers and 
Bain (2008) argue that the appreciation results from illegal capital inflows and is not 
intentional on the part of Chinese authorities. For China, maintaining growth in industrial 
employment necessitates a competitive exchange rate. Chinese authorities consider staying on 
the growth path to be crucial for political stability. This fact was also termed “Bretton Woods 
II,” with China taking the role of Europe in the 1960s. Concerns about the potential 
deterioration in the trade sector (which is the main sector emerging countries rely on) induced 
the authorities to absorb the inflow of foreign currency by accumulating reserves. As long as 
Asian central banks continue to tolerate an appreciation of their currencies against the US 
dollar, China’s demand for US bonds is a way to abandon its interest inelasticity relative to 
US interest rates.  Ahrend (2006) argues that the official capital flows into US bonds from the 
Chinese government further encourages private inflows, since investors rely on the Chinese 
central bank to ensure a strong US dollar and low interest rates, which is a favourable 
environment for bond prices. But, will this Chinese policy be sustainable and remain in the 
interest of China?  
Capital losses in dollar terms amounted to about 100 US dollar per Chinese inhabitant. 
According to Streißler (2008), calculations for the period of 2007 to 2008 show that if the 
amount of losses is broken down by inhabitants, every single Chinese would suffer a loss of 
100$ per annum. In October 2008, Chinese reserves hit a high of 1.9 trillion US dollars6. In 
the past 10 months, from January to October 2008, alone, the renminbi appreciated by 8.54 
percent6 against the US dollar. Even if one takes into account that not all reserves are held in 
US dollars the loss due to appreciation is quite high. 
Limited access to credit and a strong concern over aging in a system without an adequate 
safety net increased private savings of household and firms in emerging markets. But the 
large majority of low US interest rates does not stem from the supply side of funds through 
high foreign savings, but is due to the demand for fund from the reserve build up by Asian 
countries. 
 
                                                 
6
 Data from The Economist Intelligence Unit, October 30th 2008 
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IV.3.2) Saving industrialised countries 
Age structure is a variable affecting the savings behaviour of individuals. The demographics 
of the G7 show an increasing share of individuals approaching retirement. The elderly- 
dependency ratio, a measure of those aged over 65 relative to the population aged 15 to 64, 
has grown steadily. Following the life cycle model of savings (Modigiliani, 1970), people 
tend to dissave during their retirement. Empirics on the theory of reduced savings in the late 
stage of life are mixed (Poterba, 2004) and unclear in terms of their effects on the ´savings 
glut´ (Desroches, Francis; 2007). Nevertheless, household saving in the OECD countries has 
decreased, with the US savings volume decreasing further from its already low levels. While 
the household component of private sector saving went down, the corporate savings rate rose. 
Lusardi et al. (2001) conducted a study on the relationship of personal and corporate savings 
rates for the period of 1988 to 2000. They find that 3.5 percentage points of the decline in the 
US personal savings could be traced back to the rise in the stock market value in real terms 
over the same period. Households shift their savings to capital markets, directly or indirectly 
as shareholders (directly) or participants in pension funds (indirectly). Since households can 
be regarded as the ultimate business owners (De Serres and Pelgrin, 2003), the impact on 
personal savings seems plausible. Increasing prices for residential housing is the other crucial 
aspect of wealth effects in the household sector. Graph 11 depicts the percentage change of 
house prices in ten major US cities. From 2006 through 2008, house prices experienced a 
decline of 25 percent.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11: Case-Shiller House Price Index, source: Wolf (2008) 
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With respect to the OECD countries, particularly Germany, Japan and the US, the global 
“savings glut” translates into corporate savings and thus into a decreased demand for 
investment. A dearth of investment opportunities explains the excess of desired savings over 
realised investment. 
Rajan (2006) describes the problem as an “investment restraint” rather than a “savings glut”. 
He argues that one reason for low corporate investment is related to the prevailing 
competitiveness on the market. Financial slack is held to operate flexibly in a competitive 
environment. An increasingly fierce market for corporate control might be another reason 
why firms tend to hold cash instead of investing. Investment by US businesses in equipment 
and structure has been low (Bernanke, 2005). Much of the capital inflow into the US has 
shown up in construction of houses. House price increases stimulated consumption. Since 
imports were relatively cheap, a substantial share of consumption went to imported goods. In 
the long run, productivity was thus hindered since it is more likely to be driven by non-
residential investment (Bernanke, 2005). Bernanke favours a development of “large and 
healthy export industries” to the non-traded goods sector, to which construction and housing 
belongs. Exports would counteract the current account imbalance that is associated with costs 
of adjustment. 
 
IV.3.3) Oil exporters 
A surge in oil prices beginning in 2004 induced oil exporting countries to also invest in US 
dollars. Despite having fixed or managed exchange rates towards the dollar, central bank 
dollar reserves do not account for much of the current account surplus. But official 
institutions, such as stabilisation funds and official investment banks recycle their petro- 
dollars on the capital market (Ahrend, Catte, Price; 2006). 
The accumulation of dollars benefits the reserve currency in the form of seigniorage 
associated with the issuance of money. The process of accumulating and the usage of dollar 
reserves in countries outside of the US can be seen as Dollarization. The same mechanism is 
true for “Euroization”. Dollarization and Euroization means the expansion of the use and 
holding of the dollar and the euro, respectively, outside the issuing country. When adopting a 
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currency the “dollarised” or “euroized” country must sell goods and services to the issuing 
country, and in exchange is paid in the foreign currency. Seigniorage revenue is the value of 
goods and services the issuing country receives against its additional money creation. For the 
US the most important good received is oil. The seniorage for the old European countries is 
due to the extension of product and service markets. 
 
    IV.4. MONETARY- FISCAL POLICY MIX  
Nobel laureate Mundell (2000a) emphasises that monetary factors are crucial determinants for 
the real economy. Free capital mobility, a fixed exchange rate and an independent monetary 
policy are factors that determine the appropriate mix of fiscal and monetary policy.  
The appropriate fiscal and monetary policy mix is aimed to keep an economy’s internal and 
external balance. Keynes (1923) distinguished internal and external stability. Internal stability 
refers to the stability of prices, whereas external stability means stability in exchange rates 
and an equilibrated balance of payments. Keynes stated that priority should be given to 
internal stability, without forgetting about the external factor. The Trinity problem formulated 
by Mundell states that it is not possible to incorporate all three factors. Thus countries are 
always facing a trade-off, having to choose only two of the factors.  
In an open economy (of flexible exchange rates) in which capital can move without 
restrictions, the effect on output comes to a large extent through the exchange rate rather than 
through a stimulation or restriction on domestic demand. A permanently tighter monetary 
policy would raise interest rates and induce foreigners to invest domestically, since investors 
are always looking for an optimal risk-return relationship. The investment inflow has positive 
effects on the unemployment rate (internal balance), but acts inflationary as an increase in 
costs of labour increases prices (external balance). 
The currency would appreciate, harming the export sector and deteriorating the trade balance. 
From 2000 to the present, investment inflow to the US resulted in a booming credit industry 
and stimulated the nontradables sector. An environment of high liquidity kept the exchange 
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rate high since funds poured into US financial institutions. The large bulk of the current 
account imbalances was borne by foreign borrowing. 
 
IV.4.1) The optimal policy mix under Bretton Woods 
Since the beginning of the Bretton Woods System in 1944, through its transition to floating 
rates in 1973 and even until today, the United States has chosen different policy mixes of the 
three elements. But at no time the US did give up its ability to run an independent domestic 
monetary policy.  
Under the Bretton Woods regime, the industrial nations chose domestic autonomy and fixed 
exchange rates against the US dollar by ruling out free capital mobility. The US dollar took 
on the role of reserve currency. The price of the dollar was held fixed to gold at $35 an ounce 
from 1934 to 1973. The architecture of Bretton Woods would have required that its most 
powerful member, the US, would not pursue exclusively domestic goals, but rather would 
adopt policies geared to increase the welfare of the world economy as a whole (Krugman, 
Obstfeld; 2006). The collapse of the gold exchange standard in 1973 enabled the US to 
liberalize capital movements without sacrificing its domestic policy priorities and without 
committing to a fixed exchange rate (Broz, 1998). 
In the period up to 1973, monetary policy in the US worked through transmission 
mechanisms typical for closed economies. In a traditional closed economy, monetary policy 
operates through interest rates and affects interest-sensitive expenditures to achieve an 
internal balance (asset prices). A decrease in money supply translates into lower prices, which 
influences the trade and external balance in a positive way.  
In the 1960s under Bretton Woods Mundell (2000a) suggested a policy mix of lowering taxes 
to spur employment and tight monetary policy to protect the balance of payments in order to 
treat a situation of “sluggish growth and subpar employment”. With this policy mix the US 
achieved rapid growth and stability. 
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Would Mundell´s policy suggestion for achieving external and internal balance still lead to 
the desired outcome in a world of full capital mobility? 
 
IV.4.2) Mundell revisited 2008 
Using the trilemma framework, the US after Bretton Woods chose free capital flows and 
conducted an independent monetary policy. Mundell´s policy mix in such a setting makes the 
achievement of the goal of internal and external balance more complex.  
In monetary terms, the US acted as if it still were a closed economy, pursuing domestic goals 
without considering effects on the rest of the world. The problem with this behaviour 
ultimately has become quite clear. By remaining a reserve currency for a range of emerging 
markets, the United States exported its monetary policy to many emerging countries relying 
on the fixed exchange rate. In order to keep the rate of exchange fixed, emerging markets 
piled up dollar reserves, which benefited from asset price growth in the US through allowing 
a greater supply of credit.  
As the bubble burst, assets which were high in value before the crisis lost their ability to stand 
as collateral. Now dollar holdings of foreigners exceed the level that can be backed by US 
assets. The US thus no longer is able to maintain the value of the dollar, as it had not been 
able to maintain gold convertibility at the end of Bretton Woods.  Not being able to maintain 
the dollar value means a depreciation of the dollar. While dollar depreciation may benefit US 
exports (Feldstein, 2008), it hurts those trading partners holding vast dollar reserves. 
This is a situation Mundell already identified when discussing the right policy mix in order to 
correct the balance of payments deficit in the 1960s. Depreciation of the dollar reserves means 
shrinking the reserves by deflating the debt outstanding as the currency loses real value.  
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IV.4.3) The United States as external adjuster 
Bernanke (1983) in his studies on the Great Depression noticed that those countries that 
devalued or allowed for depreciation of their currencies experienced rapid recoveries after an 
economic downturn; "the effect of this credit squeeze on aggregate demand helped convert 
the severe [...] downturn of 1929-1930 into a protracted depression" (Bernanke, 1983). 
Martin, Schuknecht and Vansteenkiste (2007) analyse the role of the exchange rate for 
adjustment in boom and bust. The authors observe industrialised countries in the period from 
the mid 1980s to the early 1990s in order to detect patterns of exchange rate adjustments on a 
cross-country basis. The authors distinguish external versus internal adjusters. External 
adjusters are defined to experience a real effective exchange rate depreciation/ devaluation in 
the bust, whereas countries that did not have their countries depreciated/ devaluated are 
referred to as internal adjusters. 
The asset price cycle is the conceptual basis for identifying channels that explain emergence 
and evolution of boom and bust episodes in their analysis. Credit, trade, fiscal policy and 
international capital flows are the factors analysed in hindsight of the exchange rate 
adjustment process. The authors look at a number of stock and flow variables to gather insight 
on how these factors transmit to the real economy. 
Their findings reveal that, in booms, external adjusters tend to experience more overheated 
demand, increases in prices and credit as well as a loss of competitiveness, measured in the 
growth of unit labour costs, and deterioration in the balance sheets compared to internal 
adjusters. In busts, the downturns external adjusters experience are deep, but not as protracted 
as with internal adjusters. External adjusters have their imbalances unwound faster, since the 
depreciation in the currency affects the reversal of capital inflows. In a world of free capital 
flows this affects not only the current account, but affects asset prices and, through the credit 
channel, demand and output as well. 
Fiscal and external imbalances indicate that a country’s currency is more likely to respond to 
busts with depreciation/devaluation because internal adjustment is not feasible from a cost 
perspective. The adjustment strategy is thus to some extent endogenously determined because 
large imbalances increase the cost of internal adjustment.  
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Internal adjusters need to correct imbalances via domestic price adjustments in wages or the 
trade sector. External adjusters experience a credit squeeze and decreasing output. Internal 
adjusters experience an increase in real wages due to appreciation relative to other currencies. 
This harms the export sector. Revenue from the tradable sector declines, contracting the 
economy.  
Following the pattern of features, the authors find that the US fits in the group of external 
adjusters in a period of bust. Growth in asset prices and output, the fiscal and current account 
deficit and high unit labour costs are all factors pointing at external adjustment. Indeed, the 
world wide bust we are currently experiencing resulted in a depreciation of the dollar, partly 
due to the positive real interest rate differential. 
In September 2007 the Federal Reserve cut interest rates to 4.75 percent. At the same time the 
US dollar lost in value relative to the Euro. On January 1st 2008 the EUR/USD exchange rate 
was at 1.468. On April 1st 2008 it was at 1.528. On October 31th the EUR/USD exchange rate 
fell back to the level of 1.27. The US dollar increased in value. (See Graph 12.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12: Interest rate differential 3- month Treasury bill with 3-month Euribor, source: Thomson Datastream 
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    VI.5. TWIN DEFICITS 
“[T]he growth of the US trade deficit in the 1980s primarily reflects the influence of several 
interrelated macroeconomic developments….Growth of US spending relative to production 
and income implied a deterioration in the national saving-investment balance, which, in turn, 
owed much to the persistence of a large Federal deficit...” 
 Council of Economic Advisers, Economic Report of the President (1988) 
 
This statement from the year 1988 compromises an essential point in the discussion of the 
deficit in the present current account of 699 billion dollars. In the 1980s economists found 
that the current account deficit and the fiscal budget deficit were moving in the same direction 
and started a discourse on the “twin deficits”. 
During the Reagan era and beyond, the current account deteriorated slowly and steadily, and 
so did the budget deficit. Tax cuts did not result in an increase in savings, but led to further 
spending. Within 30 years the current account balance of the United States went down to a 
low of -6.5% of GDP in 2006 from approximately +/- 1% of GDP in the 1970s7. (See Figure 
13.) 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 13: US Current account balance in millions of dollars; Source: Thomson Datastream 
                                                 
7
 Data from The Economist  
Current Account Balance
-900000
-800000
-700000
-600000
-500000
-400000
-300000
-200000
-100000
0
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Current account in billion
USD
6.5% of GDP 
75 
 
IV.5.1) War finance and the budget deficit 
President Bush led wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, which became unpopular with the voters. 
Typically, unpopular wars are typically financed by printing new money: “Inflationary 
finance combines the political and economic advantages of borrowing with the immediate 
rewards of confiscatory taxation.” (Trask, 2004) 
Printing new money is essentially taxation using the back door, since the increase in money 
supply, unless hoarded, leads to depreciation and a loss in purchasing power. In a country 
with a stable current account, prices adjust faster than wages do; hence an increase in money 
supply acts as if wage earners were taxed. However, in any country with wage indexation, 
inflationary pressure does not act as a tax. In the later floating period Italian experience wages 
adjusted automatically to a cost- of- living index, such that an increase in money supply did 
not decrease wage earners´ purchasing power. Indexation reduces the output gains from 
monetary expansion. Officially the Bush administration communicated tax cuts, which 
decreased public saving. Simultaneously, the expansionary policy under Greenspan, who 
despite of his formally independent role as central bank president deliberately made clear his 
standpoint in favour of the war (Blinder, Reis; 2005), acted as a tax. Unless it is not hoarded, 
monetary expansion tends to reduce disposable income and enters the savings equation with a 
negative sign. Expenditures and tax cuts for the wars and the rebuilding of homeland security 
created a growing budget deficit and as it was financed through the issuance of new debt, and 
also created a growing current account deficit. 
 
IV.5.2) Debt finance and the current account 
Open market sales of government debt increase the monetary base and affect consumption. In 
an open economy with free capital mobility the printed money did not stay within the borders 
of the United States, but was accumulated by the rest of the world.  
Beneficial economic prospects as well as increased household wealth on the back of foreign 
debt contributed to a low savings rate in the US. The personal saving rate in the US was 
temporarily negative and between 2005 up to the collapse of the American investment banks 
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remained near zero, with consumption still on the rise. Graph 14 depicts a steep hike of the 
personal savings rate as a percentage of disposable income in September 2008. The reasons 
for this spike are unclear; perhaps it is due to a one- time change in statistical definitions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 14: US personal savings as percent of disposable income from 2003-2008 
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financing position, debt in domestic currency is less vulnerable to exchange rate volatility. 
Consequently, it allows for low interest rates. As long as the economy manages to service its 
debt, the current account deficit can grow. 
The US current account deficit has added substantially to financial market vulnerability. 
Beginning in the home mortgage market, neither home owners nor banks were able to service 
their debt. The leveraging mechanism multiplied the risk and damage of a reversal of capital 
flows. The US diminished savings rate is of great importance when considering economic 
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US personal sav ings rate as %  of disposable income 18/10/08
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
US PERSONAL SAVING AS % OF DISPOSABLE PERSONAL INCOME SADJ
Source: Thomson Datastream    
77 
 
the downturn. At present the sudden stop translated into a credit crunch and the “other twins” 
(Kaminsky, Reinhart, 1999) of a banking and currency crisis. 
 
IV.5.3) The twins: Budget deficit and current account deficit  
At the core of the theory of twin deficits lies the impact of fiscal policy on private saving. The 
fundamental accounting identity on investment and savings states that in a closed economy 
savings need to equal investment. Private savings tend to fall when fiscal policy loosens. In an 
open economy the above identity can be expanded to include the current account. Then, a 
shortfall of domestic savings while investment is maintained needs to be financed by external 
savings, which show up on the current account.  
Historically, the Keynsian approach to fiscal policy and the “Ricardian equivalence” theory 
are the two prominent opposing views on the effects of fiscal expansion on the savings rate 
and the current account.  
The Keynsian view argues in favour of the causal relationship between fiscal and current 
account deficits. An increase in fiscal spending either through tax cuts or the issuance of new 
debt results in a temporary increase of real disposable income. This changes private 
investment behaviour and increases consumption, while savings decrease. A savings shortfall 
results in a decrease in domestic investment as lower savings raise interest rates. Whether 
domestic investment is “crowded out” by the fiscal expansion depends on the country’s 
degree of openness to financial flows. If a country can borrow from abroad investment can be 
held up. Purvis (1985) already noted that in the US federal deficits were accompanied by huge 
capital inflows in the 1980s. The credit granted by foreigners decreases the balance of 
payments.  
The Ricardian view of tax cuts and government deficits explains why taxes should not alter 
the current account. Private savers neutralize the government’s effort to lower public deficits 
by lowering private sector savings. Private savers anticipate the consequences of tax cuts in 
the longer run. Savers expect an increase in the budget deficit to be followed by higher taxes 
at a later point in time to pay off the government debt. A tax cut thus results in a higher 
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savings rate and keeps the current account stable. Since financial policy is anticipated, the 
savings behaviour adjusts such that the current account is not affected by fiscal policy. In the 
Ricardian view debt finance does not affect the current account. The experience of Europe in 
the late 1990s, when European countries strove to meet the Maastricht criteria, supports the 
Ricardian theory.  
In practice, Ricardian effects on saving are thought to explain no more than half of the change 
in European savings (Obstfeld, Krugmann; 2006). In the period of 1972-1983 the large fiscal 
deficits moved in tandem with the current account deficits (Figure 15). Then, financial 
expansion resulted in about 40 to 50 percent higher consumption. Bernheim (1987) finds in 
US time series data that fiscal policy has decreased its impact on national saving. Now, one 
dollar of tax cuts increases consumption by just 20-30 percent.  
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Figure 15: US Fiscal and Current account balance from 1973 to Q2 2008; Source: Thomson Datastream 
 
This analysis would suggest that US data fit closer to the Ricardian view of national savings, 
namely that the private sectors cuts back on its investment and saves 70-80 percent. On a 
national level, a tax cut increases public debt. A tax cut of one dollar increases private saving 
by less, namely 70-80 percent. This investment gap needs to be borrowed from abroad.  
Bartolini and Lahiri (2006) present figures of the OECD countries showing that a one dollar 
increase in fiscal deficit is associated with a 33-37 per cent increase in national saving. The 
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current account´s response is a decline of 30 per cent. Changes in national savings are thus 
approximately matched by foreign saving. This implies that investment is not curbed by an 
increase in domestic saving, but rather matched by an increase in the current account deficit to 
meet consumption demand, supporting the twin hypothesis. 
 
IV.5.4) The declining impact of fiscal policy on private saving 
As for the effect of fiscal policy on private sector consumption Bartolini and Lahiri (2006) 
point out several factors explaining its declining impact. First, financial innovation enabled 
private investors to access easy borrowing to spur consumption, decoupling investment 
decisions from a fiscal stimulus. Frankel (2006) points out that the budget and trade deficit 
would not move in the same direction unless there was a huge exogenous increase in 
investment. Second, “fiscal rules” to restore or keep a balanced budget deficit induce forward-
looking behaviour by households taking a more Ricardian view. Third, a lengthening of 
working lifetimes in industrialised and emerging markets may lead workers to anticipate the 
future burden of a current tax cut.  
Thus, fiscal incentives have lost importance in determining consumption and saving 
behaviour. The effectiveness of fiscal policy is determined by the interest rate sensitivity of 
international capital flows (Purvis, 1986). This is because fiscal policy alters income through 
the interest rate. Purvis states that as international capital flows react more strongly to the 
interest rate, fiscal policy becomes less effective in directing private savings.  
Purvis’s conclusion does not apply to the US experience. It is true that foreign investment is 
attracted by higher interest rates, which in return blurs the intended output of fiscal policy in 
order to control saving. But for the US, interest sensitivity need not be high to attract foreign 
capital. Despite falling interest rates, demand for US debt instruments form the rest of the 
world is persistent. Foreign capital has been used for US consumption. Capital from emerging 
economies flows into US financial assets decoupled from considerations on interest rate 
differentials. US authorities do not have the power to control saving by setting an interest rate. 
Interest sensitivity in the US is very low which explains the declining impact of fiscal policy. 
Consumption behaviour is hard to control since debt is easily available.  
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Enders and Lee (1990) state that the current account balance is related to government 
spending, but emphasize that the deficits are not twins. Government spending impacts the 
current account, but the means for financing it do not determine the balance of payments. The 
“twins” thus may rather be siblings (Frankel, 2006). “Ricardian equivalence” theory does not 
distinguish between tax collection and bond issuance for government spending (Purvis, 1985).  
 
IV.5.5) The costs of government spending through fiscal and monetary policy  
Government spending can be financed either by tax collection or bond issuance. Taxation is a 
source of directly diminishing citizens´ disposable income. With bond issuance the debtor can 
more deliberately choose to support government spending. A mismatch of domestic savings 
and investment, be it through public or private spending, thus still shows up in the current 
account if domestic debt is held by foreigners. 
The costs of taxation and bond issuance may be borne by different players on the market. A 
domestic fiscal expansion appreciates the domestic currency and consequently shifts some of 
the expansionary effects on to the trading partners (Mundell, 1968). Monetary policy leads to 
a domestic currency depreciation, which stimulates the export sector and diverts demand 
away from the trading partner. Thus monetary expansion appears as beggar-thy-neighbour 
policy.  
Devreux and Purvis (1984) developed a model addressing the benefits of fiscal expansion in 
the short run and its costs in the long run. In the short run, a tax cut increases real liquidity 
and creates room for output expansion. In the longer run, a rise in relative price of domestic 
goods compared to foreign goods decreases demand and the producer’s real wage. According 
to the phenomenon of exchange rate overshooting (Dornbusch, 1976) the interest rate 
difference is adjusted through the exchange rate. Thus, a fiscal stimulus in an open economy 
will also reduce the economy’s net foreign asset position over time. In order to service the 
debt of a long- run current account imbalance, the trade account needs to improve. The latter 
may require a drop in domestic income or depreciation of the exchange rate.  
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In the absence of Ricardian equivalence, the problem of debt finance arises when public debt 
replaces investment in productive capital. Taxation distorts agents´ incentives and reduces 
economic efficiency (Barro, 1979). Private sector savings decrease, which puts a “primary 
burden of debt” (Purvis, 1985) on to future generations. Perrson (1984) and Blanchard (1985) 
present models showing that tax cuts contribute to the welfare of the current generation at the 
expense of future generations. 
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V. ECONOMIC OUTLOOK 
 
“A brave man would see catharsis in all this misery; a wise man would not be so hasty.”  
The Economist, September 20th 2008 
 
In the early 1980s the share of total American profits in the financial service industry took 
was 10%. Over the last twenty years this share has climbed up to 40% at its peak in 2007. I 
explain various factors that contributed to this growing bubble that is finally bursting. The 
macro- and micro-economic consequences that will ultimately result remain to be seen. As 
economic data show, the crisis has spilled over from the US to the rest of the world. How 
severe the economic downturn will be is unclear. In the remainder of this paper I analyse 
policy actions and present some scenarios of the future path for North America, Europe and 
Asia. 
 
Consequences for the United States 
In 2007 and early 2008 it seemed as if Bernanke´s monetary policy was successful in averting 
a more protracted economic downturn. Interest rates tumbled and so did the dollar relative to 
the euro and the yen. This benefited the export sector and eventually helped to decrease the 
deficit in the current account. Facing high inflation, Europe seemed to struggle more than the 
United States. 
Another quarter year later the economic outlook for the US has deteriorated. 
On Friday, 19th of September the fourth largest US investment bank filed for bankruptcy. Two 
days later the remaining two investment banks declared a change in status, giving up their 
independent position as investment banks and becoming commercial banks under control of 
the Federal Reserve. Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley, the two largest investment banks 
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changed their status in order to gain access to the broader sources of funding from the Federal 
Reserve. A few days earlier the two banks had declared that they are not interested in pairing 
with a commercial bank, arguing that they were financially healthy enough to survive as stand 
alone investment banks (Financial Times, Sept 16). 
In light of the biggest restructuring since 1929, newspapers have heralded the end of Wall 
Street. The “Trennbanken”- system as it prevailed since the 1933 Glass Steagall Act, which 
divided the US financial industry into commercial and investment banks, appears to have 
ended. The latter banks have come to be referred to as the shadow banking system, as they are 
largely exempted from governmental control and able to take on high leverage. 
Colm Kelleher, chief financial officer at Morgan Stanley, said, “These markets are all about 
confidence and we are proudly confident in the robustness of our franchise, business model 
and balance sheet.”  Finally, illiquidity was too severe a problem for Morgan Stanley and 
Goldman Sachs to keep the status of an investment bank. After the events of the last few 
months, the federal government now owns a large share in two brokerage firms, two 
government sponsored enterprises, and a multinational insurance company. The very 
American policy of free markets has been hit hard. Institutions like the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) will have a hard time justifying their policy rhetoric in 
developing countries, when they are about to give credit on the requirement of free capital 
markets. 
The current situation seems reminiscent in some respects to the Savings and Loan (S&L) 
crisis in the late 1980s. Then, the industry implosion led to the government bailout of almost 
all S&L institutions and eliminated the S&L banking system. In the LTCM crisis a Resolution 
Trust Corporation was founded, which bought the assets from the S&L institutions. The 
creation of the corporation allowed finding out the true values of the institutions that had run 
into trouble and brought the necessary “catharsis” to re-establish trust in the financial 
industry. 
This time the problem manifests itself in illiquidity as well, as it did in other banking crises. 
But, contrary to the LTCM crisis in the 1990s, the source of the problem is massive 
insolvency and indebtedness of households. 
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Statistical offices deliver data that uniformly point at a recession. The government has bailed 
out several big financial players. The Federal Reserve provides liquidity funding through its 
discount window. But will the monetary policy actions taken by the Federal Reserve be 
effective?  
As the persistently high LIBOR rate suggests, central bank liquidity injections are rather 
ineffective. Since the turmoil on financial markets has its roots in the inability of debtors to 
repay their debt, a recession is not averted by injecting money.  
Weidensteiner, analyst at Commerzbank, said that much of the fresh Fed funds being pumped 
into money markets would find its way back into US Treasury bills rather than being 
extended as credit, because banks seek the safest investments possible. (Agence France 
Presse, 27th September 2008) This impedes the expansionary policy that delivers money to the 
real economy. The country is left in a liquidity trap. 
Meanwhile markets wait for the $700 billion bank rescue plan discussed in the US Congress. 
Currently, there are two models under consideration. One is the Paulson model (supported by 
Bernanke), which proposes a reverse auction, after which the government is to buy the bad 
assets of financial institutions. The other model is recapitalization of banks by the 
government and is in line with Warren Buffet’s idea of investing in Goldman Sachs. The 
difficulty with the Paulson plan lies in distributing the appropriate amount at the appropriate 
price to the appropriate debtors. But after a due diligence, which both plans provide, 
judgements about the asset values have to be reached. Interest rates on the preferred shares as 
well as warrant prices will give information about firms´ conditions in the recapitalization 
plan.   
Both rescue plans deal with the supply side of finance, or “Wall Street”. Helping to boost 
demand from “Main Street” by expanding fiscal policy is the second pillar of rescue. The 
means to address the downturn are rather weak in the US. The saving rate is at times negative 
and the budget deficit is mounting. The possibilities under Keynesian economics are already 
limited. Japan went through a similar crisis and ended up with an extended period of deflation 
and ineffective monetary policy to deal with the boom and bust of the real estate bubble. 
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The dollar crisis 
The current crisis also constitutes a severe crisis of the dollar. With the euro as a viable 
alternative currency, the dollar has come under pressure to defend its role as a leading reserve 
currency. Low interest rates and a – up until recently depressed –dollar weaken its status as a 
world currency and induce countries to diversify their reserve portfolios.  
Foreign central banks are already reducing the share of reserves they hold in the US dollar. 
Deutsche Bank predicts that the euro will constitute between 30 and 40 per cent of world 
reserves by 2010. In recent years, China, South Korea, Russia and a number of Middle East 
oil-exporting countries have all reduced the proportion of international reserves they hold in 
dollars, which reduces the benefits of US dollar seignorage.  
 
 
Will the rest of the world decouple from developments in the US? 
The crisis started in the US, but its repercussions are observed in the rest of the world. 
Financial contagion in the European financial industry has already been massive. In the 
current financial meltdown, the ones who financed the excessive risk taking are sovereign 
wealth funds of the Arab world and of Asia. Certain European countries also stand on the 
creditors´ side.  
“Everyone assumes the American players took the vast majority of the writedowns. In fact, 
about 45 per cent of the total was taken by the Europeans.” 
Mr. Annunziata of UniCredit; Report on business; Sept 24th 2008  
 
According to the IMF´s assessment of financial markets, the global figure for writedowns has 
been revised up to $1.4 trillion in October 2008. How severely the crisis will hit European 
banks and Europe’s real economy is still a question for the future. A banking crash in the EU 
will depend on whether mistrust and uncertainty still allow banks to get funding. There is 
uncertainty about what level the losses in sub-prime loans will reach and by how much home 
prices are going to decrease. Uncertainty also prevails as to where the toxic assets are held. 
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Repercussions on Europe  
Europe is already experiencing housing price deflating in Great Britain, Ireland, Denmark, 
Spain and Italy. According to the ECB, the sub-prime mortgage crisis spilled over to the euro 
area money market on 9 August 2007 as indicated by the spread between the three-month 
Euribor and the EONIA swap rate. The ECB and other central banks reacted to the situation 
of tight liquidity on the markets with additional operations to re-establish trust in the markets.  
 
In a speech in August 2008, Central Bank president Trichet firmly stated that the ECB´s 
primary mandate is keeping price stability and being a solid anchor of inflation expectations.  
The proper functioning of the money market is the other mandate of the ECB. The 
organisation of the central bank reflects the distinction between these two mandates. The ECB 
clearly distinguishes between monetary policy decisions, which cover the midterm- stance 
and liquidity operations, which operate on a short-term basis. This separation, known as the 
“two pillar” model should allow for clear signals. Allotment decisions stand isolated from 
monetary policy decisions with the intent that liquidity management decisions do not provoke 
misunderstanding of monetary policy intentions due to active liquidity management. 
The problem with increasing the allotment banks can get from the central bank is that this 
action still does not end the questioning of who is holding the toxic assets on their balance 
sheets. In order to end the money market meltdown it is necessary to eliminate the causes of 
the mistrust and uncertainty. European firms heavily depend on banks. The crisis will show 
whether the bank based system and relationship banking is able to act as shock absorber in 
hard times. If banks face large writedowns, then the real economy will also be hit by an 
ongoing credit squeeze.   
The OECD says that the stronger role of European governments in their economies creates 
more effective means to address an economic downturn. Europe's automatic stabilizers – 
lower taxes and higher subsidies as economic activity slows – are three times more effective 
than those of the United States.  
A problem that becomes more apparent in times of financial distress is the disunity of the 
European Union. Poorer countries, such as Spain and Italy, would need monetary stimuli, 
which are not compatible with the primary goal of price stability in richer euro zone countries. 
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Another very important issue concerns the euro zone and the relation to its Eastern European 
neighbours. If the old European member countries are not able to decouple from the US, 
Eastern Europe will not be able to decouple either. Eastern European countries heavily 
depend on foreign funding from euro zone banks, foremost Swedish and Austrian banks. High 
uncertainty will also withhold private and personal debt finance from these emerging markets. 
Since Europe has deeply invested in US assets and also competes on the export market, a 
depreciating dollar will have negative repercussions on countries´ foreign debt positions.  
Amid the high impact events in the US financial sector, the US dollar is not observed to 
tumble faster relative to the euro. The fact is that the rest of the world financed US housing- 
driven consumption. As analysis of the 1930 crisis shows, the lenders experienced the most 
protracted recession. 
The worrying prospect is the type of deflation Japan has been experiencing for over a decade. 
This has reversed in the meantime. Deflation reflects a slump in demand and causes excess 
capacity. Irving Fisher (1933) wrote a paper on the vicious downward spiral that leads to an 
economic slump. Falling prices may cause consumers to put off purchases, inducing demand 
and prices to fall further.  For economies already facing high levels of debt, this means that 
the debt burden is getting worse as prices are falling. As asset prices fall, credit contraction 
forces debtors to cut spending and to sell off assets. These are the repercussions of debt-
deflation. 
Central banks outside of the US still have some ammunition left for fighting deflation by 
cutting interest rates. If the US economy defaults on its debt, the creditors will have to suffer 
the losses. For the current situation, the beggar-thy-neighbour policy began with the inflating 
dollar. At the same time the value of assets lent out decreased. Countries that hold vast dollar 
reserves, as well as investors putting their money into assets (either directly or through 
complex financial products), that finally became worthless, will definitely carry the burden of 
the current crisis.  
So far, policymakers around the world are trying to get debt-deflation on track by 
guaranteeing debt in order to slow the process of deleveraging and the downward spiral. 
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Repercussions on China and East Asia 
Over the past decade, China’s growth path has been lauded in the financial and academic 
press. Nevertheless, China’s economic growth is controversial for several reasons. I list two, 
namely, that China’s growth is mainly driven by the export sector and  that it has not managed 
to pass on its export revenues to its people . Up until 2006 China fixed its exchange rate to the 
US dollar to keep its manufacturing industry competitive. This explains the asset price 
inflation without a simultaneous product price inflation in OECD countries. China’s current 
account surplus with the US and the EU is large. China holds vast dollar reserves and 
government bonds. Jointly with Europe, Saudi Arabia and Brazil, China is a huge creditor to 
the US economy. 
Whether China is able to decouple from the economic slowdown in OECD countries is still 
uncertain. There are various scenarios for the future path of China.  
First of all, since China finances the US, it is in its interest to keep the exchange rate to the US 
dollar from appreciating too rapidly. The dollar has already depreciated against the renminbi. 
A fall in the dollar value relative to the Chinese currency means a loss for the Chinese 
government and Chinese citizens. Following the financial turmoil in the US it appeared that 
the credit squeeze would bring in its wake a correction of the American and Chinese current 
account imbalance, due to a declining dollar value and slowing exports. Since the export 
sector accounts for half of China’s GDP, a depreciation of the dollar relative to the renminbi 
severely affects China’s growth. A mitigating effect of this development is put forward in 
several scenarios for China’s future by Tyers and Bain (2008). 
For one scenario Tyers and Bain argue that global investments are experiencing a transitory 
flight and are finally pouring into Chinese investment (McKibbin and Stoekel, 2007). If China 
is able to absorb additional investment it can have favourable effects for the Chinese people. 
In the longer run, growth redirects investment towards a rising the service sector.  
With funding from North America and Western Europe, China’s declining imports can be 
offset by this change in financial capital movements. While China’s exports take a hit as the 
currency appreciates, the closing financial capital imbalance and the associated boost in 
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China’s GDP ensures that import growth is more than sustained. A worsening of the export 
sector need not become true if appreciation is not larger than the huge productivity increase.  
The currency would appreciate further. This scenario implies that China, which already holds 
a large capital stock, and other emerging economies in East Asia would be able to direct 
further investments to the real economy. China is already investing 45% of its GDP annually 
(Rosen and Hauser, 2007). 
In another scenario the Chinese government would not expose the country to risky investment 
inflows that might destabilize the system. One explanation for this is that an inflow of capital 
would inevitably drive up the exchange rate causing either faster inflation or more rapid 
nominal appreciation. Tyres and Bain (2008) argue that the recent rise in the renminbi/dollar 
exchange rate was driven by illegal capital inflows and not intended by the government. In 
order to stay competitive Chinese authorities might choose a policy response implementing 
tighter controls on capital inflows. The other policy choice is reserve accumulation to set off 
exchange rate adjustments. Further reserve accumulation of its main trading partners would 
increase the Chinese saving rate further. Since investment that does not enter China is put 
somewhere else, other emerging economies might experience a capital inflow. In return, their 
currencies would appreciate, putting them into a less competitive position than China, which 
kept its currency low.  
 
 
INSTITUTIONAL CHANGES 
The crisis has already brought about the search for what has gone wrong and whether 
institutional changes are needed to address the issues of financial instability. Free capital 
markets seem to have been replaced with stricter capital controls. 
Remsperger (2008), director at the German control bank, argues that the preconditions for a 
self regulated market in the financial industry are not given since banks have access to central 
bank money. It has become obvious that market forces are not able to avoid bubbles and their 
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repercussions. I agree that easy money through the Greenspan – and now Bernanke – put 
increases moral hazard; but I am not of the opinion that the access to central bank money is 
the sole argument that explains why the financial industry has become so unstable and unable 
to regulate itself.  The availability of central bank money makes it harder to aim at finding the 
true value of an asset, as does the complexity of the financial industry and global business 
ties. Under what conditions industries are able to regulate themselves, without state 
intervention, is another point for further discussion, which I will not elaborate here. 
 
In any case, an extension of the supervisory framework is heavily demanded. Whether the 
state regulation will be prescriptive and detailed or rather oriented towards known principles 
remains open to discussion. 
Regulators argue for higher equity ratios in the credit business. Apart from the traditional 
credit industry, the focus for regulation lies on the players that so far have been exempted 
from state regulation:  hedge funds and investment banks (on those that still exist). Moreover, 
critics also attack the rating agencies, since Basel II uses ratings from those agencies to assess 
credit risks. Basel II is a framework for a more comprehensive measure for capital adequacy 
and sets up minimum standards.  
 
Basel II seeks to promote a more forward-looking approach to capital supervision. The Basel 
credit risk standards try to make capital requirements more risk sensitive. Assets are evaluated 
at their current values. This fact has come into criticism since it is said to enhance 
procylicality. Borio (2007) analyses macro- prudential policy stances in order to increase 
stability. He addresses the problem of measures and standards that enhance cyclicality. For 
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), rating agencies are first on the list of 
scapegoats for the global financial crisis. The SEC calls for resolving conflicts of interest, as I 
discuss them in the chapter on rating agencies. 
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Appendix 
 
 
Appendix 1: Distribution analysis of the S&P 500  -  R output 
 
 
 
> daten<-read.table(file="D:/Mappe2.txt",header=T,sep="\t") 
> dim(daten) 
 
[1] 9776    7 
> plot(rev(daten[,5]),t="l",log="y") 
 
> close<-rev(daten[,5])                 #data closing price S&P 500 
 
> returns<-(close[-1]-close[-length(close)])/close[-length(close)] 
> hist(returns.m,breaks=100,freq=F,main="Distribution 
S&P500",xlab="Returns",ylab="",axes=F)                    #Histogram 
> curve(dnorm(x, mean=mean(returns), sd=sd(returns)), 
add=TRUE,col="green",lwd=2)        #graph normal distribution 
>  
> axis(side=1, at=seq(-0.08,0.08,0.04), labels=seq(-0.08,0.08,0.04)) 
>  
> require("fTrading")                                  #load package 
Lade nötiges Paket: fTrading 
In library(package, lib.loc = lib.loc, character.only = TRUE, 
logical.return = TRUE,  : 
> jarque.bera.test(returns)                        #Jarque Bera Test 
 
        Jarque Bera Test 
data:  returns  
X-squared = 201948.9, df = 2, p-value < 2.2e-16 
> skewness(returns)                                         #Schiefe 
[1] -0.8865226 
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> kurtosis(returns)                                        #Kurtosis 
[1] 22.19144 
>  
> mean(returns)*100                         #mean returns in percent 
[1] 0.03107635 
> sd(returns)*100       #standard deviation daily returns in percent  
[1] 0.9976125 
> 
> sd(returns)*sqrt(252)*100    #standard deviation yearly returns in     
percent (*100) 
[1] 15.83661 
>  
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Abstract (English): 
 
In my thesis I analyse factors which contributed to the financial crisis that first became 
evident on the US housing market and late off, after the collapse of Lehman Brothers on 
September 15th, had spilt over on markets in the rest of the world. My analysis ends by 
November 1st 2008. Risk perception, financial innovation, global imbalances and both fiscal 
and monetary policies are now subject to a closer analysis drawing on findings form historic 
crises. I stress the fact that our environment is too complex to model it with linear 
assumptions. Measurement errors in the mathematical models underlying investment 
decisions and a changed environment for investment products, including falling asset prices, 
are further analysed. Since monetary policy significantly contributed to the crisis I take a 
closer look at transmission mechanisms. I study cross-country differences in the financing 
system and elaborate the features of a bank-based versus a market-based banking system, 
which prevails in Europe and the US, respectively. Moreover I discuss implications of fiscal 
policy for the behaviour on financial markets. My economic outlook focuses on the 
economies of the United States, Europe and Asia and the role of the United States as “world 
banker”.    
The thesis is sought to put the discussion over the remedies to the crisis on a broader base and 
to emphasize the need to take into account the issues of risk, financial innovations, global 
imbalances and both monetary and fiscal policy.  
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Abstract (German): 
 
Meine Diplomarbeit beschäftigt sich mit der Analyse der unterschiedlichen Faktoren, die in 
ihrem Zusammenspiel zu der Entwicklung der Finanzmarktkrise - beginnend 2007 am US 
amerikanischen Immobilienmarkt - beigetragen haben. Meine Analyse, die auch die 
Ausweitung der Schweirigkeiten auf die Finanzmärkten der restlichen Welt miteinbezieht, 
endet mit November 2008. Innovative Finanzprodukte, globale Ungleichgewichte, die 
Wahrnehmung von Risiko, sowie geld- und fiskalpolitische Maßnahmen sind nun Gegenstand 
meiner Arbeit und stehen im Kontext zu vergangenen Krisen. Kritisches Augenmerk lege ich 
auf Annahmen, die versuchen ein komplexes Umfeld in ein lineares Model zu fassen. 
Statistische Messfehler und ihre Verarbeitung in mathematischen Modellen entziehen 
Investmententscheidungen die Rechtfertigung, wenn Vermögenswerte einem massiven 
Preisverfall ausgesetzt sind. Geldpolitische Entscheidungen übertragen sich nicht immer in 
gewünschter Form auf die Realwirtschaft. Die Übertragungsmechanismen der Zinspolitik 
bedürfen daher einer genaueren Betrachtung. Anhand der Arbeiten von Kaufmann und 
Valderrama (2007, 2008) untersuche ich länderspezifische Unterschiede in den 
Finanzsystemen der USA und Europas in Bezug auf den Übertragungsmechanismus des 
Kreditsektors. Das in den USA vorherrschende Finanzsystem lässt sich als marktbasiert 
kennzeichnen, während das Prinzip der Hausbanken in Europa auf ein bankbasierendes 
System schließen lässt. 
Abschließend fasse ich die Erkenntnisse aus meiner Analyse in einem Ausblick auf die 
zukünftige Entwicklung der Volkswirtschaften der USA, Europas und Asiens zusammen und 
diskutiere die Rolle der USA als „world banker“. Ziel meiner Arbeit ist es die Diskussion 
über mögliche Maßnahmen zur Bewältigung der Krise auf eine breite Basis zu setzen, und 
Grundlage für die Kritikpunkte an Risikomessung, globalen finanziellen Ungleichgewichten, 
sowie der Geld- und Fiskalpolitik, zu bieten. 
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